上市公司大股东减持股份时的诚信义务

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归属院系：

民商法学院（知识产权学院）

作者：

刘晓驰

导师：

曹兴权

导师单位：

民商法学院（知识产权学院）

学位：

硕士

语种：

中文

关键词：

上市公司大股东;股份减持;诚信义务

摘要：

近年来，上市公司大股东减持乱象频繁上演，严重冲击证券市场稳定，损害中小股东利益。对此，证监会连续出台多部规定以引导大股东有序减持，并已形成了以《上市公司股东、董监高减持股份的若干规定》（下称“减持新规”）为代表的上市公司股份减持制度。减持新规实施两年多以来已取得一定成效，但减持乱象仍有屡禁不止的趋势，投资者权益经常受到损害却救济无门。因此，本文基于大股东减持中的中小股东利益救济的视角，探讨大股东在减持股份时的诚信义务问题，试图提出更有效的减持问题解决方案。 本文除引言外，正文共分为四个部分。 第一部分，上市公司大股东减持股份时承担诚信义务的法理基础。大股东减持股份的行为不仅是其行使股东权利的私行为，也因其特殊性而关涉投资者权益、证券市场秩序、上市公司治理及实体经济等方面。因而大股东的减持行为需由公司法与证券法调整。首先，大股东减持股份时承担诚信义务是股东平等原则的必然要求。现代公司法的股东平等原则强调实质平等，禁止股东间缺乏合理性的差别待遇，要求股东的权利义务对等。大股东有着中小股东无法比拟的优势地位，若不对大股东减持权利加以限制，其很可能利用优势地位实施不公平的减持行为，损害中小股东利益。其次，大股东的减持诚信义务符合证券法的诚实信用原则。证券市场因其特殊性而对诚信有更强的需求。信息不对称影响证券交易的公平，投资者交易预期的实现依赖证券发行人诚信处置投资资金。大股东享有信息优势，具有相对集中的公司控制权，因而其是否诚信行使减持权利，直接关系投资者的权益实现、证券市场的秩序平稳。最后，大股东与中小股东之间存在事实上的信义关系，中小股东的投资权益极易受大股东的减持行为影响，因而应当要求大股东承担减持诚信义务，禁止滥用权利。 第二部分，上市公司大股东减持股份时的诚信义务之具体要求：（1）持续披露持股信息——首先，信息不对称使得大股东容易通过减持实施“隧道挖掘”行为，严重侵害中小股东利益；其次，大股东的持股信息系投资者的决策依据，影响投资者交易预期的形成，持续披露持股信息利于维护中小股东的动态交易预期。因此，大股东减持前需预先披露其减持计划、及时披露减持计划的实施情况、并于每月向证券交易所申报其持股比例。同时应当将所减持的“股份”扩张解释为“证券权益”。（2）合理控制减持1 额度——为防范大股东减持机会主义行为及保障交易公平，需限制大股东减持额度。应根据上市公司股份数量、市值、性质区别设计大股东减持数量限制；增加大股东每日减持数量限制规定；大股东以任何方式购入的股份及取得的证券权益均应当纳入减持额度限制范围。（3）价格敏感期禁止减持——为防范不当的利益冲突，需禁止大股东在可能诱发其机会主义行为的时期减持；价格敏感期的判断宜引入“价格敏感性”与“理性投资者”标准。（4）严格履行减持承诺——大股东对减持事项的公开承诺使投资者产生高强度的信赖，为保障投资者交易预期的实现，大股东应当严格履行减持承诺。（5）不得损害中小股东合理交易预期——减持本质上与中小股东对大股东诚信发挥其公司治理权的期待相违背，因而大股东减持应当符合中小股东合理预期。这是大股东减持诚信义务的兜底性要求，大股东不当减持类型无法穷尽，因而需以兜底性条款予以限制。第三部分，上市公司大股东违反减持诚信义务的民事责任。审判大股东违反减持诚信义务的民事赔偿案件应树立以“合理期待原则”“维持利益均衡原则”为核心的裁判理念，既要对投资者适度倾斜保护，又应当关注股权投资商业属性及大股东权利保障。大股东违反减持诚信义务行为及其损害后果与虚假陈述行为及其后果具有本质一致性，都是对投资者信赖的损害，因而其损害赔偿责任认定应借鉴虚假陈述行为责任体系。减持诚信义务兼具行为标准与责任标准，违反减持诚信义务的行为不一定都承担损害赔偿责任，关键在于判断是否实质损害投资者合理期待，可借鉴“重大性标准”予以认定。损害赔偿范围应以投资者实际损失为主，实际损失宜采用“投资差额法”，并以大股东不当收益为基准确定具体赔偿数额。因果关系应以信赖推定为主，同时根据投资者经验、投资知识、抗风险能力合理分配举证责任。归责原则宜采用过错推定原则。 第四部分，上市公司大股东减持制度的完善。当前减持制度存在“效力层级低，缺乏体系性”，“处罚手段有限，威慑力不足”，“缺乏投资者的民事救济途径”等突出问题。应以大股东减持诚信义务为规制核心完善减持制度，形成以《证券法》、证监会部门规章、证券交易所自律规则为有机一体的减持规范体系：《证券法》应做好顶层设计，规定大股东减持诚信义务的依据，明确相关民事责任，为下位法的“续造”提供方向指导与底线约束；证监会部门规章应构建实施细则；证券交易所应灵活运用自律监管手段，发挥对大股东减持行为的引导与监督作用。此外，最高人民法院应适时推出指导裁判证券民事赔偿案件的统一司法解释。

学科：

民商法学

提交日期：

2026-04-10

引用参考：

刘晓驰. 上市公司大股东减持股份时的诚信义务[D]. 西南政法大学,2019.

全文附件授权许可：

知识共享许可协议-署名

  • dc.title
  • 上市公司大股东减持股份时的诚信义务
  • dc.contributor.schoolno
  • 20160301050419
  • dc.contributor.author
  • 刘晓驰
  • dc.contributor.affiliation
  • 民商法学院（知识产权学院）
  • dc.contributor.degree
  • 硕士
  • dc.contributor.childdegree
  • 法学硕士
  • dc.contributor.degreeConferringInstitution
  • 西南政法大学
  • dc.identifier.year
  • 2019
  • dc.contributor.advisor
  • 曹兴权
  • dc.contributor.advisorAffiliation
  • 民商法学院（知识产权学院）
  • dc.language.iso
  • 中文
  • dc.subject
  • 上市公司大股东;股份减持;诚信义务
  • dc.subject
  • Major Shareholders of Listed Company;Shares Reduction;FiduciaryDuty
  • dc.description.abstract
  • 近年来，上市公司大股东减持乱象频繁上演，严重冲击证券市场稳定，损害中小股东利益。对此，证监会连续出台多部规定以引导大股东有序减持，并已形成了以《上市公司股东、董监高减持股份的若干规定》（下称“减持新规”）为代表的上市公司股份减持制度。减持新规实施两年多以来已取得一定成效，但减持乱象仍有屡禁不止的趋势，投资者权益经常受到损害却救济无门。因此，本文基于大股东减持中的中小股东利益救济的视角，探讨大股东在减持股份时的诚信义务问题，试图提出更有效的减持问题解决方案。 本文除引言外，正文共分为四个部分。 第一部分，上市公司大股东减持股份时承担诚信义务的法理基础。大股东减持股份的行为不仅是其行使股东权利的私行为，也因其特殊性而关涉投资者权益、证券市场秩序、上市公司治理及实体经济等方面。因而大股东的减持行为需由公司法与证券法调整。首先，大股东减持股份时承担诚信义务是股东平等原则的必然要求。现代公司法的股东平等原则强调实质平等，禁止股东间缺乏合理性的差别待遇，要求股东的权利义务对等。大股东有着中小股东无法比拟的优势地位，若不对大股东减持权利加以限制，其很可能利用优势地位实施不公平的减持行为，损害中小股东利益。其次，大股东的减持诚信义务符合证券法的诚实信用原则。证券市场因其特殊性而对诚信有更强的需求。信息不对称影响证券交易的公平，投资者交易预期的实现依赖证券发行人诚信处置投资资金。大股东享有信息优势，具有相对集中的公司控制权，因而其是否诚信行使减持权利，直接关系投资者的权益实现、证券市场的秩序平稳。最后，大股东与中小股东之间存在事实上的信义关系，中小股东的投资权益极易受大股东的减持行为影响，因而应当要求大股东承担减持诚信义务，禁止滥用权利。 第二部分，上市公司大股东减持股份时的诚信义务之具体要求：（1）持续披露持股信息——首先，信息不对称使得大股东容易通过减持实施“隧道挖掘”行为，严重侵害中小股东利益；其次，大股东的持股信息系投资者的决策依据，影响投资者交易预期的形成，持续披露持股信息利于维护中小股东的动态交易预期。因此，大股东减持前需预先披露其减持计划、及时披露减持计划的实施情况、并于每月向证券交易所申报其持股比例。同时应当将所减持的“股份”扩张解释为“证券权益”。（2）合理控制减持1 额度——为防范大股东减持机会主义行为及保障交易公平，需限制大股东减持额度。应根据上市公司股份数量、市值、性质区别设计大股东减持数量限制；增加大股东每日减持数量限制规定；大股东以任何方式购入的股份及取得的证券权益均应当纳入减持额度限制范围。（3）价格敏感期禁止减持——为防范不当的利益冲突，需禁止大股东在可能诱发其机会主义行为的时期减持；价格敏感期的判断宜引入“价格敏感性”与“理性投资者”标准。（4）严格履行减持承诺——大股东对减持事项的公开承诺使投资者产生高强度的信赖，为保障投资者交易预期的实现，大股东应当严格履行减持承诺。（5）不得损害中小股东合理交易预期——减持本质上与中小股东对大股东诚信发挥其公司治理权的期待相违背，因而大股东减持应当符合中小股东合理预期。这是大股东减持诚信义务的兜底性要求，大股东不当减持类型无法穷尽，因而需以兜底性条款予以限制。第三部分，上市公司大股东违反减持诚信义务的民事责任。审判大股东违反减持诚信义务的民事赔偿案件应树立以“合理期待原则”“维持利益均衡原则”为核心的裁判理念，既要对投资者适度倾斜保护，又应当关注股权投资商业属性及大股东权利保障。大股东违反减持诚信义务行为及其损害后果与虚假陈述行为及其后果具有本质一致性，都是对投资者信赖的损害，因而其损害赔偿责任认定应借鉴虚假陈述行为责任体系。减持诚信义务兼具行为标准与责任标准，违反减持诚信义务的行为不一定都承担损害赔偿责任，关键在于判断是否实质损害投资者合理期待，可借鉴“重大性标准”予以认定。损害赔偿范围应以投资者实际损失为主，实际损失宜采用“投资差额法”，并以大股东不当收益为基准确定具体赔偿数额。因果关系应以信赖推定为主，同时根据投资者经验、投资知识、抗风险能力合理分配举证责任。归责原则宜采用过错推定原则。 第四部分，上市公司大股东减持制度的完善。当前减持制度存在“效力层级低，缺乏体系性”，“处罚手段有限，威慑力不足”，“缺乏投资者的民事救济途径”等突出问题。应以大股东减持诚信义务为规制核心完善减持制度，形成以《证券法》、证监会部门规章、证券交易所自律规则为有机一体的减持规范体系：《证券法》应做好顶层设计，规定大股东减持诚信义务的依据，明确相关民事责任，为下位法的“续造”提供方向指导与底线约束；证监会部门规章应构建实施细则；证券交易所应灵活运用自律监管手段，发挥对大股东减持行为的引导与监督作用。此外，最高人民法院应适时推出指导裁判证券民事赔偿案件的统一司法解释。
  • dc.description.abstract
  • In recent years, large shareholders of listed companies reduce their holdings of chaos frequently staged, seriously impact the stability of the securities market, damage the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders.In this regard, China securities regulatory commission has issued a number of regulations to guide large shareholders to reduce their holdings in an orderly manner, and has formed a stock reduction system of listed companies represented by several provisions on the high reduction of shares held by shareholders and directors of listed companies (hereinafter referred to as "new regulations on reduction of shares held").Since the implementation of the new regulations on reduction of holdings more than two years has achieved some results, but the reduction of the disorderly situation still has the trend of repeated prohibition, investors' rights and interests are often damaged but no way to relief.Therefore, based on the perspective of the interests relief of small and medium-sized shareholders in the reduction of large shareholders, this paper discusses the issue of the integrity obligation of large shareholders in the reduction of shares, trying to put forward a more effective solution to the problem of reduction. In addition to the introduction, the text is divided into four parts. The first part is the legal basis for the major shareholders of listed companies to assume the obligation of good faith when reducing their shares.The reduction of shares by major shareholders is not only the private behavior of exercising shareholders' rights, but also related to investors' rights and interests, securities market order, listed company governance and real economy due to its particularity.Therefore, the reduction of large shareholders needs to be adjusted by the company law and securities law.First of all, it is necessary for major shareholders to undertake the obligation of good faith when reducing their shares.The principle of equality of shareholders in modern company law emphasizes substantial equality, prohibits the lack of reasonable differential treatment among shareholders, and requires equal rights and obligations of shareholders.Large shareholders have an unmatched advantage over small and medium-sized shareholders. If the right to reduce the holdings of large shareholders is not restricted, they are likely to use their dominant position to carry out unfair reduction behavior and damage the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders.Secondly, the principal shareholders 'obligation to reduce their credit is in line with the principle of good3 faith in securities law.Because of its particularity, the securities market has a stronger demandfor integrity.Information asymmetry affects the equity of securities trading, and the expectedrealization of investors trading depends on the integrity of the securities issuer to dispose ofinvestment funds.Major shareholders enjoy information advantage and relatively centralizedcontrol of the company, so whether they exercise the right to reduce their holdings in goodfaith is directly related to the realization of investors' rights and interests and the smooth orderof the securities market.Finally, there is an actual fiduciary relationship between majorshareholders and small and medium-sized shareholders. The investment rights and interests ofsmall and medium-sized shareholders are easily affected by the behavior of majorshareholders in reducing their holdings, so the major shareholders should be required toassume the obligation of good faith in reducing their holdings, and the abuse of rights isprohibited. In the second part, the specific requirements of the duty of good faith when the majorshareholders of listed companies reduce their shares :(1) continuous disclosure ofshareholding information.Secondly, the shareholding information of large shareholders is thebasis of investors' decision-making, which affects the formation of investors' tradingexpectations. Continuous disclosure of shareholding information is conducive to maintainingthe dynamic trading expectations of small and medium-sized shareholders.Therefore, majorshareholders need to disclose their reduction plan in advance, timely disclose theimplementation of the plan, and declare their shareholding ratio to the stock exchange everymonth.At the same time, the "share" expansion should be interpreted as "securities equity".(2)reasonable control of the reduction quota -- in order to prevent the opportunistic behavior oflarge shareholders and guarantee the fair transaction, it is necessary to limit the reductionquota of large shareholders.According to the differences in the number, market value andnature of the shares of listed companies, the limitation on the reduction of the number ofmajor shareholders should be designed.To increase the limit on the amount of daily reductionby major shareholders;The shares purchased by major shareholders in any way and thesecurities interests acquired shall be subject to the limit of the reduction amount.(3)prohibition of reducing holdings in price-sensitive periods -- in order to prevent improperconflicts of interest, it is necessary to prohibit large shareholders from reducing holdings inperiods that may induce their opportunistic behaviors;"Price sensitivity" and "rationalinvestor" criteria should be introduced to judge the price sensitive period.(4) strictly fulfill the4 reduction commitment -- the public commitment of major shareholders to the reduction causes investors to have a high degree of trust. In order to ensure the realization of investors' trading expectations, major shareholders should strictly fulfill the reduction commitment.(5) reasonable trading expectations of small and medium-sized shareholders shall not be harmed. In essence, the reduction of holdings is contrary to the expectation of small and medium-sized shareholders to give full play to their corporate governance rights in good faith, so the reduction of large shareholders shall conform to the reasonable expectations of small and medium-sized shareholders.This is the substantial shareholders to reduce the credibility of the obligation to cover the requirements, improper reduction of major shareholders can not be exhausted, so we need to cover the provisions to limit. The third part, the listed company's major shareholders in violation of the obligation to reduce the civil liability of good faith.In the trial of civil compensation cases in which major shareholders violate the duty of reducing the holding of good faith, we should set up the judgment concept of "reasonable expectation principle" and "maintaining the balance of interests principle" as the core, which should not only protect the investors moderately, but also pay attention to the business nature of equity investment and the protection of the rights of major shareholders.The violation of the duty of good faith by major shareholders and their damage consequences are essentially consistent with the misrepresentation and its consequences, which are both damage to the trust of investors.There are both standards of conduct and standards of responsibility for the reduction of good faith obligations, and ACTS violating the reduction of good faith obligations may not all bear the liability for damages. The key lies in determining whether the substantial damage is reasonably expected by investors, which can be identified by referring to the "material standard".The scope of compensation for damages should be dominated by the actual losses of investors, and the actual losses should adopt the "investment difference method", and the specific compensation amount should be determined based on the improper gains of major shareholders.The causal relationship should be based on the presumption of trust, and the burden of proof should be reasonably allocated according to the investor's experience, investment knowledge and risk resistance ability.The principle of imputation should adopt the principle of presumption of fault.The fourth part, the improvement of the reduction system of major shareholders of listed companies.The current reduction system has such prominent problems as "low effectiveness5 level, lack of system", "limited means of punishment, insufficient deterrent" and "lack of civilremedy for investors".Should with major shareholders holdings of fiduciary duty for coreimprove underweight system of rules and regulations, form "securities law", the securities andfutures commission departments self-discipline rules and regulations, the stock exchange forthe organic integration of underweight specification system: the top design, "securities law"should be stipulated reduction of large shareholders is the basis of fiduciary duty, clearlyrelated to civil liability, for the XiaWeiFa "continue" to provide direction and the bottom lineconstraints;The rules and regulations of the CSRC department shall establish detailed rules forimplementation;Stock exchanges should flexibly use self-regulatory means to play a leadingand supervising role in reducing the holdings of major shareholders.In addition, the supremepeople's court should timely launch a unified judicial interpretation to guide the adjudicationof securities civil compensation cases.
  • dc.date.issued
  • 2026-04-10
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