国有企业董事会规范化建设路径探析

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作者:

袁亚洲

导师:

汪青松

导师单位:

民商法学院(知识产权学院)

学位:

硕士

语种:

中文

关键词:

国有企业;董事会;规范化

摘要:

自 2004 年由国资委主导推动国有企业公司制改革至今,国企董事会建设被作为重点难点始终贯穿其中,其间通过各种探索尝试取得的成效毋庸置疑,但客观上囿于国有企业特殊的产权构成和传统的运行机制等因素,国企董事会在具体运行中各种不足和限制仍然存在。论文围绕国有企业董事会规范化建设,以《公司法》为视角,以国企董事会独立于《公司法》规定的“特殊性”为问题切入,总结实践中国企董事会建设的具体问题,剖析原因,尝试提出国企董事会规范化建设的主要路径。 第一部分,通过系列实证性统计资料,系统梳理我国国有企业董事会建设概况。首先,追溯董事会治理的源头,梳理董事会治理沿革路径和发展阶段;其次,对国有企业进行明确界定,聚焦本文研究范围;最后,归纳梳理我国国有企业董事会建设的具体措施和取得成效。 第二部分,以《公司法》为参照,梳理国企董事会建设实践中内部指导性文件的规定及做法,发现“特殊性”,为后文分析问题提供切口:董事选任在操作层面与《公司法》制衡理念不相容;董事会对经理层的聘任权实质上与《公司法》存在冲突;董事履责在事实上与《公司法》规定不一致;公司章程约束范围与《公司法》规定存在出入。 第三部分,结合我国国企董事会建设实践,从董事会独立性加强、董事长与总经理权力边界划分、董事选任机制完善、董事会秘书作用发挥、董事会考核和评价体系建设、董事责任追究机制建立等六个方面梳理董事会建设存在的“不规范”问题以及具体表现,并结合分析得出四方面主要原因:一是国有企业产权不够优化;二是国资委双重角色相当程度存在矛盾冲突;三是国企内部制约因素客观存在;四是对国企董事会立法支撑力度有限。 第四部分,运用比较分析法,对美国、德国、新加坡三个国家国有企业董事会建设的做法和特点进行综合对比研究,得出其共性与个性,归纳各种模式的优势,并从中找到适合我国国企董事会规范化建设的启示:一是适度分散国企产权优化产权结构;二是通过探索外部董事和职工董事作用发挥提升董事会独立性;三是通过加强相关立法让董事会建设依法依规开展。 1 第五部分,针对前文梳理出的问题及原因,尝试将董事会建设的“规范性”分解为独立性、高效性、科学性三个维度,并分别依据三个维度对理顺治理主体权责、强化董事会自身建设、优化激励约束机制进行探索;围绕强化国企董事会独立性,提出深化国资委授权放权改革、明晰董事长与总经理职权划分、理顺董事会与国企党组织关系三个层面的具体措施路径;以董事会运行的高效性为中心,提出构建规范的外部董事管理体系、加强董事会专门委员会建设、健全董事会秘书制度三个层面的具体措施路径;围绕董事会评估的科学性,提出构建多元化评价主体、完善优化评价内容两个层面的具体措施路径。

学科:

民商法学

提交日期

2026-04-10

引用参考

袁亚洲. 国有企业董事会规范化建设路径探析[D]. 西南政法大学,2019.

全文附件授权许可

知识共享许可协议-署名

  • dc.title
  • 国有企业董事会规范化建设路径探析
  • dc.contributor.schoolno
  • 29140503084
  • dc.contributor.author
  • 袁亚洲
  • dc.contributor.affiliation
  • 民商法学院(知识产权学院)
  • dc.contributor.degree
  • 硕士
  • dc.contributor.childdegree
  • 法学硕士
  • dc.contributor.degreeConferringInstitution
  • 西南政法大学
  • dc.identifier.year
  • 2019
  • dc.contributor.advisor
  • 汪青松
  • dc.contributor.advisorAffiliation
  • 民商法学院(知识产权学院)
  • dc.language.iso
  • 中文
  • dc.subject
  • 国有企业;董事会;规范化
  • dc.subject
  • state-owned enterprises; board of directors; standardization
  • dc.description.abstract
  • 自 2004 年由国资委主导推动国有企业公司制改革至今,国企董事会建设被作为重点难点始终贯穿其中,其间通过各种探索尝试取得的成效毋庸置疑,但客观上囿于国有企业特殊的产权构成和传统的运行机制等因素,国企董事会在具体运行中各种不足和限制仍然存在。论文围绕国有企业董事会规范化建设,以《公司法》为视角,以国企董事会独立于《公司法》规定的“特殊性”为问题切入,总结实践中国企董事会建设的具体问题,剖析原因,尝试提出国企董事会规范化建设的主要路径。 第一部分,通过系列实证性统计资料,系统梳理我国国有企业董事会建设概况。首先,追溯董事会治理的源头,梳理董事会治理沿革路径和发展阶段;其次,对国有企业进行明确界定,聚焦本文研究范围;最后,归纳梳理我国国有企业董事会建设的具体措施和取得成效。 第二部分,以《公司法》为参照,梳理国企董事会建设实践中内部指导性文件的规定及做法,发现“特殊性”,为后文分析问题提供切口:董事选任在操作层面与《公司法》制衡理念不相容;董事会对经理层的聘任权实质上与《公司法》存在冲突;董事履责在事实上与《公司法》规定不一致;公司章程约束范围与《公司法》规定存在出入。 第三部分,结合我国国企董事会建设实践,从董事会独立性加强、董事长与总经理权力边界划分、董事选任机制完善、董事会秘书作用发挥、董事会考核和评价体系建设、董事责任追究机制建立等六个方面梳理董事会建设存在的“不规范”问题以及具体表现,并结合分析得出四方面主要原因:一是国有企业产权不够优化;二是国资委双重角色相当程度存在矛盾冲突;三是国企内部制约因素客观存在;四是对国企董事会立法支撑力度有限。 第四部分,运用比较分析法,对美国、德国、新加坡三个国家国有企业董事会建设的做法和特点进行综合对比研究,得出其共性与个性,归纳各种模式的优势,并从中找到适合我国国企董事会规范化建设的启示:一是适度分散国企产权优化产权结构;二是通过探索外部董事和职工董事作用发挥提升董事会独立性;三是通过加强相关立法让董事会建设依法依规开展。 1 第五部分,针对前文梳理出的问题及原因,尝试将董事会建设的“规范性”分解为独立性、高效性、科学性三个维度,并分别依据三个维度对理顺治理主体权责、强化董事会自身建设、优化激励约束机制进行探索;围绕强化国企董事会独立性,提出深化国资委授权放权改革、明晰董事长与总经理职权划分、理顺董事会与国企党组织关系三个层面的具体措施路径;以董事会运行的高效性为中心,提出构建规范的外部董事管理体系、加强董事会专门委员会建设、健全董事会秘书制度三个层面的具体措施路径;围绕董事会评估的科学性,提出构建多元化评价主体、完善优化评价内容两个层面的具体措施路径。
  • dc.description.abstract
  • Since the reform of state-owned enterprises' company system led by the SASAC (state-owned assets supervision and administration commission)in 2004, the construction of the board of directors of state-owned enterprises has always been a key and difficult point among them. There is no doubt that the achievements made through various explorations and attempts have been achieved. However, objectively, the board of directors of state-owned enterprises is limited by such factors as the special property right composition of state-owned enterprises and the traditional operating mechanism. This paper focuses on the standardization construction of the board of directors of state-owned enterprises, starting from the perspective of the company law and taking the "particularity" of the board of directors of state-owned enterprises that is independent from the provisions of the company law as a base. It summarizes the specific problems of the construction of the board of directors of state-owned enterprises in practice, analyzes the reasons, and tries to propose the main paths of the standardization construction of the board of directors of state-owned enterprises. In the first part, by sorting out and enumerating the empirical statistics, the general situation of the construction of the board of directors of state-owned enterprises in China is sorted out. Firstly, it traces back the emergence of board governance and combs the main development stages of board governance; secondly, it defines the carrier state-owned enterprises, which are the research objects of the paper, and defines the scope of the paper; finally, it summarizes the main measures and results of the board construction of state-owned enterprises in China. The second part, with the "company law" as a reference, to find the particularity by sorting out the provisions and practices in the internal guidance documents in the construction practice of the board of directors of state-owned enterprises, and provided an incision for the following analysis. There is a conflict between the board of directors' right of appointment and the company law; In fact, the liability of directors is inconsistent with the provisions of the company law; and the limited scope of the articles of association is different from the provisions of the company law. The third part combs the existence of the board of directors from six aspects: strengthening the independence of the board of directors, demarcating the power boundary 1 between the chairman and the general manager, improving the mechanism of selecting and appointing directors, exerting the role of the secretary of the board of directors, building the evaluation system of the board of directors and establishing the mechanism of investigating directors' responsibilities. There are four main reasons as follows: firstly, the property rights of state-owned enterprises are not optimized enough; secondly, the dual roles of SASAC are contradictory to a certain extent; thirdly, the internal constraints of state-owned enterprises exist objectively; and fourthly, the legislative support of the board of directors of state-owned enterprises is limited. The fourth part uses the comparative analysis method, conducts a comprehensive comparative study on the practices and characteristics of the board construction of state-owned enterprises in the United States, Germany and Singapore, obtains its commonness and individuality, analyses the advantages of various modes, and finds out the enlightenment suitable for the standardization construction of the board of directors of state-owned enterprises in China: firstly, the property right structure of state-owned enterprises should be optimized; secondly, the independence of the board of directors should be enhanced by exploring the role of external directors and staff directors; and finally, the construction of the board of directors should be carried out in accordance with the law by strengthening relevant legislation. The fifth part is to explore the problems and reasons of the previous article, and explore the rights and responsibilities of the governance body, strengthen the construction of the board of directors, and optimize the incentive and restraint mechanism from the three dimensions of independence, efficiency and science. Independence, it proposes to deepen the authorization of the SASAC, to clarify the division of authority between the chairman and the general manager, and to rationalize the three measures of the relationship between the board of directors and the state-owned enterprise party organization; The specific management path of the director management system, the strengthening of the special committee of the board of directors, and the improvement of the secretary system of the board of directors; on the scientific nature of the evaluation of the board of directors, the paper proposes to construct a diversified evaluation subject, improve the content of the evaluation, and strengthen the application of the evaluation results.
  • dc.date.issued
  • 2026-04-10
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