互联网平台个人信用评分的法律规制

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作者:

杨帆

导师:

盛学军

导师单位:

经济法学院(生态法学院)

学位:

博士

语种:

中文

关键词:

互联网平台;信用评价;个人征信

摘要:

互联网平台(以下简称“平台”)指提供支付、结算、身份认证、数据分析、物流、资金融通、行为管理与调控等网络服务的私人组织。平台个人信用评分主要用于衡量网络个人用户的信用状况,是由多种统计模型组合运用、信息与数据相互印证、主观判断与机器学习相结合的复杂行为。互联网平台个人信用评分源于平台在网络环境中控制风险、传导信号的商业需求。其基本流程是平台利用信用评价算法分析海量的信息与数据的过程。该过程客观上产生了评判信用的信息类型不断扩展、信用评价算法的商业价值与保护需求不断增强两种效果。与西方社会相比,我国的平台集信息提供者、评分生产者、平台规则执行主体、数字经济市场等多种角色于一身。互联网平台个人信用评分的形成与运用更容易产生利益冲突问题。当前的法律制度并未对该问题做出充分而恰当的回应。 互联网平台个人信用评分在经济领域与社会领域已经获得广泛的应用。在平台塑造的兼具开放性与封闭性的网络空间中,其能为平台中与平台影响范围内的网络交易活动传导风险信号,提高平台对交易活动的控制力。在更为宽广的社会领域,互联网平台个人信用评分成为平台在信息社会中开展社会信用协同治理(以下简称“数字信用共治”)的有效工具。社会信用体系建设以多元主体协同为理念和方式。作为互联网平台个人信用评分的行为主体,平台不仅依法获得网络行为规范的制定权,对网络空间的信用治理具有较大的自主决定空间,还为数字信用共治提供技术架构。互联网平台个人信用评分超越了消费信用范畴,成为个人声誉在信息社会的重要延伸,既在经济领域具有一定的权威性,又是平台管理失信被执行人网络行为的主要工具。 互联网平台个人信用评分是平台生产的个人声誉,却具有个人征信的本质属性。在价值功能与规范目的方面,互联网平台个人信用评分具有缓解信息不对称的价值,并更加侧重维护网络市场交易秩序的功能。互联网平台个人信用评分的规范目的是促进信用经济的健康发展与协调多元主体的利益诉求。其主体利益协调比传统个人征信复杂得多,与围绕个人信息产生的数字信用共治、数字经济发展等具体问题相互影响与制约,必须通过法律机制解决。互联网平台个人信用评分与个人在其他领域的信用评价具有功能关联关系,但是在运行机理、法律性质与权利来源方面存在明显差异, 1 不应套用个人征信以外的其他个人信用评价的法律规制方式。互联网平台个人信用评分并未改变收集、整理、加工、保存、公布信息的个人征信本质。但是,其依赖大数据和人工智能技术的应用,深刻地改变了个人征信的信息处理范围、信息流通需求、信用评价机构独立性,还为被评价者带来“同人不同分”的算法偏见风险。 传统个人征信的规制机理在运用于互联网平台个人信用评分时容易出现问题。个人征信的规制理念是在信息公开与信息保护之间寻求平衡。传统个人征信中,被征信者信息权益的分配主要发生在个体与国家之间。在应然层面,个人征信的规制原则涉及个人信息保护一般原则与个人征信特别原则。在实然层面,我国个人征信制度一直缺乏明确的法律原则,应有的被征信者信息权益保护原则缺位。长期的公共利益倾向还造成个人征信特别原则与个人信息保护一般原则难以统合的情形。这为个人征信实践随意扩大信息处理范围埋下伏笔,也为平台利用传统个人征信机构所不处理的信息数据生产个人信用评分,提供了价值观念上的支持。当前的个人征信法律制度一定程度上涉及大数据应用的前瞻性,但是未深入思考大数据应用对个人征信的实质改变。 从宏观层面观察,传统个人征信的“个人—社会”二元利益结构被互联网平台个人信用评分的“社会—平台—个人”三元利益结构取代。为容纳新的利益形态,个人征信规制理念已从“侧重信息保护”升级为“信息保护与信息利用并重”。然而,传统强调维护公共利益的价值导向,使得个人征信规制原则不仅难以回应平台的利益诉求,还可能造成被评价者的信息权益受到来自平台利益和公共利益的复合侵扰。从微观层面观察,个人征信制度滞后性与互联网平台个人信用评分创新性之间的反差,导致平台个人信用评分的法律性质、主体权利与义务、监督管理问题均未被纳入规制范畴。上述个人征信规制理论基础失范的根本原因是:互联网平台个人信用评分具有平台自治的外形却不具备平台自治的实质,而是与国家管制个人征信的理念存在牵连。其功能须以私人利益为诱因,经由私人组织执行,以达到管制目的,追求公益实现。这种矛盾的现实反映就是:随着平台成为新生的规制力量,社会公共利益、平台经济利益、个人信息权益之间的紧张关系难以在现行个人征信制度中获得调和。 平台个人信用评分与传统个人征信的共生与转化关系,是信用治理内涵多样性与规范互动性的现实反映。信用治理只能在特定的文化、经济、制度条件下维持暂时的均衡状态,这是个人征信法律机制必须正视、适应与回应的问题。要解决这一问题,需对个人征信规制理论基础进行发扬与更新:其一,个人征信法律机制必须坚守保护2 信息弱者的宗旨。其二,个人征信法律机制需要在排除平台妨碍个人征信市场机制的行为、避免互联网平台个人信用评分完全挤出传统个人征信两个方面发挥功能。其三,将信用评价算法应用及其风险纳入个人征信法律制度,发挥法律的激励功能,弹性地应对风险社会的治理要求。保护信息弱者、激励技术发展与重视市场竞争三个维度贯穿于互联网平台个人信用评分从生产到运用的整体流程,同时也分别侧重地反映在信用评价信息收集、信用评价算法应用与个人信用评分应用三个环节之中。 首先,信息处理是互联网平台个人信用评分行为的起始环节。考察发现:第一,现行个人征信管理制度难以契合互联网平台个人信用评分信息处理行为的技术特征而规制效用有限;第二,现行人格权制度未能有效地保护被评价者的信息权益;第三,现行个人信息保护制度存在行为指引不足的局限。究其原因,信用概念的演化推动信用评价算法的发展。信用评价算法的发展引发信用治理形式的革新。信用治理形式的革新为平台的信息处理行为提供正当性依据。平台的信息处理行为看似中立与客观,其私人价值取向与其公共治理功能之间却存在冲突。因此,要有效地规制互联网平台个人信用评分信息处理行为,应当在遵循制度优化理念的前提下,充分地吸纳个人信息保护规则,构建与该行为技术特征相契合的信息处理制度。 其次,信用评价算法应用是互联网平台个人信用评分区别于传统个人征信的最突出特征。个人征信管理制度在信用评价算法应用及其风险规制方面的效用有限。有关人工智能技术承载物致害风险的法律制度也难以适用于信用评价算法应用:其一,现行产品责任制度虽具有一定的合理性,却缺乏可操作性,故需要改进。其二,责任保险制度除面临费率认定等诸多问题外,还与我国的现实需求相悖,故不应适用。应当通过产品责任与算法规制的融通并用来规制信用评价算法应用,保护被评价者的知情、查询、异议、纠错权益与财产利益。产品责任制度着眼于填补被评价者的实际损失,信用评价算法规制着重保护被评价者的预期利益。产品责任制度应当在算法缺陷认定与举证责任承担两个方面予以合理改造。信用评价算法规制需要以一定限度的算法透明为指导原则,以保护人的自主性为出发点,协调与跨越不同的规制安排。 最后,互联网平台个人信用评分的应用场景不断扩展,其滥用问题随之显现。滥用行为可归纳为被评价者虚构信用、互联网平台限制竞争、行为人实施消费信贷诈骗、数字信用共治中的滥用行为四种类型,涉及个人信息权益、平台经济利益、网络交易秩序、社会信用水平、社会经济安全五类法益。评分应用行为难受司法约束的表 3 现是:其一,此类纠纷未被划入相应的案由。其二,司法裁判更多落脚于维护个人信息权益以外的其他法益。司法中的利益衡量方法乃是将涉案利益与公共利益对比和评价,将平台与被评价者视为平等民事主体,以此为基础开展的利益衡量必然导致利益重要性天平的偏向。单纯依赖司法事后救济渠道并不足以妥善地保护各方的权益,必须构建一种过程性规制结构,有机地整合事前许可、事中干预与事后监管。该过程性法律规制由两部分组成。一是需要对符合条件的互联网平台采取针对数字市场基础设施的治理措施。二是在个人信息保护部门、中国人民银行、市场监督管理部门及反垄断执法部门的合作下,充分吸纳第三方监督机构参与监督活动,构建面向新型个人征信市场的多元治理结构。

学科:

经济法学

提交日期

2026-03-31

引用参考

杨帆. 互联网平台个人信用评分的法律规制[D]. 西南政法大学,2021.

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知识共享许可协议-署名

  • dc.title
  • 互联网平台个人信用评分的法律规制
  • dc.contributor.schoolno
  • B2018030107089
  • dc.contributor.author
  • 杨帆
  • dc.contributor.affiliation
  • 经济法学院(生态法学院)
  • dc.contributor.degree
  • 博士
  • dc.contributor.childdegree
  • 法学博士
  • dc.contributor.degreeConferringInstitution
  • 西南政法大学
  • dc.identifier.year
  • 2021
  • dc.contributor.advisor
  • 盛学军
  • dc.contributor.advisorAffiliation
  • 经济法学院(生态法学院)
  • dc.language.iso
  • 中文
  • dc.subject
  • 互联网平台;信用评价;个人征信
  • dc.subject
  • Internet Platforms;Credit Evaluation;Personal Credit
  • dc.description.abstract
  • 互联网平台(以下简称“平台”)指提供支付、结算、身份认证、数据分析、物流、资金融通、行为管理与调控等网络服务的私人组织。平台个人信用评分主要用于衡量网络个人用户的信用状况,是由多种统计模型组合运用、信息与数据相互印证、主观判断与机器学习相结合的复杂行为。互联网平台个人信用评分源于平台在网络环境中控制风险、传导信号的商业需求。其基本流程是平台利用信用评价算法分析海量的信息与数据的过程。该过程客观上产生了评判信用的信息类型不断扩展、信用评价算法的商业价值与保护需求不断增强两种效果。与西方社会相比,我国的平台集信息提供者、评分生产者、平台规则执行主体、数字经济市场等多种角色于一身。互联网平台个人信用评分的形成与运用更容易产生利益冲突问题。当前的法律制度并未对该问题做出充分而恰当的回应。 互联网平台个人信用评分在经济领域与社会领域已经获得广泛的应用。在平台塑造的兼具开放性与封闭性的网络空间中,其能为平台中与平台影响范围内的网络交易活动传导风险信号,提高平台对交易活动的控制力。在更为宽广的社会领域,互联网平台个人信用评分成为平台在信息社会中开展社会信用协同治理(以下简称“数字信用共治”)的有效工具。社会信用体系建设以多元主体协同为理念和方式。作为互联网平台个人信用评分的行为主体,平台不仅依法获得网络行为规范的制定权,对网络空间的信用治理具有较大的自主决定空间,还为数字信用共治提供技术架构。互联网平台个人信用评分超越了消费信用范畴,成为个人声誉在信息社会的重要延伸,既在经济领域具有一定的权威性,又是平台管理失信被执行人网络行为的主要工具。 互联网平台个人信用评分是平台生产的个人声誉,却具有个人征信的本质属性。在价值功能与规范目的方面,互联网平台个人信用评分具有缓解信息不对称的价值,并更加侧重维护网络市场交易秩序的功能。互联网平台个人信用评分的规范目的是促进信用经济的健康发展与协调多元主体的利益诉求。其主体利益协调比传统个人征信复杂得多,与围绕个人信息产生的数字信用共治、数字经济发展等具体问题相互影响与制约,必须通过法律机制解决。互联网平台个人信用评分与个人在其他领域的信用评价具有功能关联关系,但是在运行机理、法律性质与权利来源方面存在明显差异, 1 不应套用个人征信以外的其他个人信用评价的法律规制方式。互联网平台个人信用评分并未改变收集、整理、加工、保存、公布信息的个人征信本质。但是,其依赖大数据和人工智能技术的应用,深刻地改变了个人征信的信息处理范围、信息流通需求、信用评价机构独立性,还为被评价者带来“同人不同分”的算法偏见风险。 传统个人征信的规制机理在运用于互联网平台个人信用评分时容易出现问题。个人征信的规制理念是在信息公开与信息保护之间寻求平衡。传统个人征信中,被征信者信息权益的分配主要发生在个体与国家之间。在应然层面,个人征信的规制原则涉及个人信息保护一般原则与个人征信特别原则。在实然层面,我国个人征信制度一直缺乏明确的法律原则,应有的被征信者信息权益保护原则缺位。长期的公共利益倾向还造成个人征信特别原则与个人信息保护一般原则难以统合的情形。这为个人征信实践随意扩大信息处理范围埋下伏笔,也为平台利用传统个人征信机构所不处理的信息数据生产个人信用评分,提供了价值观念上的支持。当前的个人征信法律制度一定程度上涉及大数据应用的前瞻性,但是未深入思考大数据应用对个人征信的实质改变。 从宏观层面观察,传统个人征信的“个人—社会”二元利益结构被互联网平台个人信用评分的“社会—平台—个人”三元利益结构取代。为容纳新的利益形态,个人征信规制理念已从“侧重信息保护”升级为“信息保护与信息利用并重”。然而,传统强调维护公共利益的价值导向,使得个人征信规制原则不仅难以回应平台的利益诉求,还可能造成被评价者的信息权益受到来自平台利益和公共利益的复合侵扰。从微观层面观察,个人征信制度滞后性与互联网平台个人信用评分创新性之间的反差,导致平台个人信用评分的法律性质、主体权利与义务、监督管理问题均未被纳入规制范畴。上述个人征信规制理论基础失范的根本原因是:互联网平台个人信用评分具有平台自治的外形却不具备平台自治的实质,而是与国家管制个人征信的理念存在牵连。其功能须以私人利益为诱因,经由私人组织执行,以达到管制目的,追求公益实现。这种矛盾的现实反映就是:随着平台成为新生的规制力量,社会公共利益、平台经济利益、个人信息权益之间的紧张关系难以在现行个人征信制度中获得调和。 平台个人信用评分与传统个人征信的共生与转化关系,是信用治理内涵多样性与规范互动性的现实反映。信用治理只能在特定的文化、经济、制度条件下维持暂时的均衡状态,这是个人征信法律机制必须正视、适应与回应的问题。要解决这一问题,需对个人征信规制理论基础进行发扬与更新:其一,个人征信法律机制必须坚守保护2 信息弱者的宗旨。其二,个人征信法律机制需要在排除平台妨碍个人征信市场机制的行为、避免互联网平台个人信用评分完全挤出传统个人征信两个方面发挥功能。其三,将信用评价算法应用及其风险纳入个人征信法律制度,发挥法律的激励功能,弹性地应对风险社会的治理要求。保护信息弱者、激励技术发展与重视市场竞争三个维度贯穿于互联网平台个人信用评分从生产到运用的整体流程,同时也分别侧重地反映在信用评价信息收集、信用评价算法应用与个人信用评分应用三个环节之中。 首先,信息处理是互联网平台个人信用评分行为的起始环节。考察发现:第一,现行个人征信管理制度难以契合互联网平台个人信用评分信息处理行为的技术特征而规制效用有限;第二,现行人格权制度未能有效地保护被评价者的信息权益;第三,现行个人信息保护制度存在行为指引不足的局限。究其原因,信用概念的演化推动信用评价算法的发展。信用评价算法的发展引发信用治理形式的革新。信用治理形式的革新为平台的信息处理行为提供正当性依据。平台的信息处理行为看似中立与客观,其私人价值取向与其公共治理功能之间却存在冲突。因此,要有效地规制互联网平台个人信用评分信息处理行为,应当在遵循制度优化理念的前提下,充分地吸纳个人信息保护规则,构建与该行为技术特征相契合的信息处理制度。 其次,信用评价算法应用是互联网平台个人信用评分区别于传统个人征信的最突出特征。个人征信管理制度在信用评价算法应用及其风险规制方面的效用有限。有关人工智能技术承载物致害风险的法律制度也难以适用于信用评价算法应用:其一,现行产品责任制度虽具有一定的合理性,却缺乏可操作性,故需要改进。其二,责任保险制度除面临费率认定等诸多问题外,还与我国的现实需求相悖,故不应适用。应当通过产品责任与算法规制的融通并用来规制信用评价算法应用,保护被评价者的知情、查询、异议、纠错权益与财产利益。产品责任制度着眼于填补被评价者的实际损失,信用评价算法规制着重保护被评价者的预期利益。产品责任制度应当在算法缺陷认定与举证责任承担两个方面予以合理改造。信用评价算法规制需要以一定限度的算法透明为指导原则,以保护人的自主性为出发点,协调与跨越不同的规制安排。 最后,互联网平台个人信用评分的应用场景不断扩展,其滥用问题随之显现。滥用行为可归纳为被评价者虚构信用、互联网平台限制竞争、行为人实施消费信贷诈骗、数字信用共治中的滥用行为四种类型,涉及个人信息权益、平台经济利益、网络交易秩序、社会信用水平、社会经济安全五类法益。评分应用行为难受司法约束的表 3 现是:其一,此类纠纷未被划入相应的案由。其二,司法裁判更多落脚于维护个人信息权益以外的其他法益。司法中的利益衡量方法乃是将涉案利益与公共利益对比和评价,将平台与被评价者视为平等民事主体,以此为基础开展的利益衡量必然导致利益重要性天平的偏向。单纯依赖司法事后救济渠道并不足以妥善地保护各方的权益,必须构建一种过程性规制结构,有机地整合事前许可、事中干预与事后监管。该过程性法律规制由两部分组成。一是需要对符合条件的互联网平台采取针对数字市场基础设施的治理措施。二是在个人信息保护部门、中国人民银行、市场监督管理部门及反垄断执法部门的合作下,充分吸纳第三方监督机构参与监督活动,构建面向新型个人征信市场的多元治理结构。
  • dc.description.abstract
  • Internet platforms (hereinafter referred to as "platforms") refer to private organizations that provide network services such as payment, settlement, identification, data analysis technology, logistics, capital financing, behavior management and regulation. Personal credit scoring of the platforms is mainly used to measure the credit of individual users on the Internet, which is a complex combination of multiple statistical models, information and data, subjective judgment and machine learning. Personal credit scores of Internet platforms originate from the commercial needs to control risks and transmit signals in the online environment. Its basic process is the process of analyzing massive amount of information and data by platforms using credit evaluation algorithms,which causes two effects, namely the expanding type of information for judging credit as well as the increasing commercial value and protection needs of credit evaluation algorithms. Compared to Western societies, China's platforms take roles of information providers, score producers, platform rule enforcement subjects, and digital markets. The formation and application of personal credit scores are more likely to create conflict of interest issues. The current legal system does not provide an adequate and appropriate response to this issue. Personal credit scores of Internet platforms have gained wide application in the economic and social fields. In the cyberspace shaped by platforms, they could transmit risk signals for online trading activities in platforms or within the influence of platforms, and improve the control of platforms over trading activities. In the broader social field, personal credit scores of Internet platforms have become effective tools to carry out collaborative social credit governance (hereinafter referred to as "digital credit co-regulation"). The concept and approach of social credit system construction is based on the collaboration of multiple subjects. As the actors of personal credit scoring, platforms not only obtain the right to formulate online behavior norms in accordance with the law, but also have more room for independent decision on credit governance in cyberspace as well as provide technical framework for digital credit co-regulation. Personal credit scoring also goes beyond consumer credit in the information society, having a certain authority in the economic field as well as being the main tool for platforms to manage the online behavior of defaulted executors. 1 Personal credit scores are personal reputations produced by platforms with the essential attributes of personal credit. Firstly, in terms of value function and regulatory purpose, personal credit scores have the value of alleviating information asymmetry but focuse more on the function of maintaining the order of online market transactions. The regulatory purpose of personal credit scores is to promote the healthy development of the digital economy and coordinate the interests of multiple subjects. The dispute of interests in personal credit scores is much more complicated than traditional personal credit, which interacts with specific issues such as the co-regulation of digital credit and the development of the digital economy. Therefore, the dispute of interests in personal credit scores must be resolved through legal mechanisms. Secondly, personal credit scores have a functional relationship with credit evaluation of individuals in other fields, but there are obvious differences in the operation mechanism, legal nature and source of rights. Therefore, personal credit scores should be applied to the legal regulation of traditional personal credit. Thirdly, personal credit scoring has not changed the essence of personal credit in the aspects of collation, processing, preservation and publication of information. However, the application of big data and artificial intelligence technology has profoundly changed the scope of information processing, information circulation needs, and independence of personal credit agencies, and also brought the risk of algorithmic bias for individuals. Therefore, the regulatory mechanism of traditional personal credit is prone to problems when applied to personal credit scoring. The regulatory concept of personal credit is to seek a balance between information disclosure and information protection. In traditional personal credit, the distribution of information rights and interests of the creditee mainly occurs between individuals and the state. At the contingent level, the regulatory principles of personal credit involve the general principles of personal information protection and the special principles of personal credit. However, China's personal credit system lacks clear legal principles. Not only the principle of protecting the information rights and interests of creditee is missing, but the long-term tendency of public interest also causes such situation that it is difficult to unify the special principles of personal credit with the general principles of personal information protection. This has laid the groundwork for the arbitrary expansion of the scope of information processing in the practice of personal credit, and also provided value support for the platforms to use data not processed by traditional personal credit agencies to produce personal credit scores. The current legal system of personal credit is to some extent 2 concerned with the prospective application of big data, but lacks of in-depth thinking on the substantive changes to personal credit by the application of big data. From the macro level, the traditional individual credit binary interest structure of "individual-society" is replaced by the "society-platform-individual" interest structure of individual credit scoring of Internet platforms. The "society-platform-individual" interest structure has been replaced by the "society-platform-individual" interest structure of Internet platform personal credit scoring. In order to accommodate the new interests, the concept of personal credit regulation has been upgraded from "focusing on information protection" to "placing equal emphasis on information protection and information utilization". However, the traditional value orientation of emphasizing the protection of public interests makes it difficult to respond to the interests of the platforms, and may cause the information rights of the evaluated person to be infringed by the interests of the platforms and public interests. At the micro level, the contrast between the lagging personal credit system and the innovative personal credit scoring of Internet platforms has led to the fact that the legal nature of personal credit scoring of Internet platforms, the rights and obligations of subjects, and the supervision and management issues have not been included in the scope of regulation. The fundamental reason for the aforementioned failure of the theoretical basis of personal credit regulation is that personal credit scoring has the appearance but not the substance of platform autonomy, but is implicated in the idea of state regulation of personal credit. Its function must be induced by private interests and implemented by private organizations in order to achieve regulatory purposes and pursue the realization of the public good. The reality of this contradiction is that as platforms become regulatory forces, the tension between public interests, the economic interests of platforms and the rights and interests of personal information are difficult to be reconciled in the current personal credit system. The symbiotic and transformational relationship between personal credit scores and traditional personal credit is a realistic reflection of the diversity of connotations and normative interaction of credit governance. Credit governance only maintains a temporary state of equilibrium under specific cultural, economic and institutional conditions, which is a problem that the legal mechanism of personal credit must face up to, adapt to and respond to. It is necessary to carry forward the theoretical basis of personal credit regulation: firstly, the legal mechanism of personal credit must adhere to the purpose of protecting the disadvantaged individuals. Secondly, the legal mechanism of personal credit needs to function 3 in two ways: to exclude platforms from hindering the market mechanism of personal credit, and to avoid the extrusion of personal credit scores into traditional personal credit. Thirdly, incorporating credit evaluation algorithms risks into the legal mechanism of personal credit, which can serve both the incentive function of the legal system and the flexibility to respond to the governance requirements of the risk society. These three dimensions run through the overall process of personal credit scoring, and are also reflected in the three links of credit evaluation material collection, credit evaluation algorithm application and personal credit scoring application respectively. Firstly, information processing is the starting of personal credit scoring. The personal credit legal system has limited regulatory utility and is difficult to fit the technical characteristics of the information processing behavior of platforms. The personality rights legal system also fails to effectively protect the information rights and interests of the evaluated person. The personal information protection legal system has the limitation of insufficient behavioral guidelines. The reason of these failures is that the evolution of the concept of credit has driven the development of credit evaluation algorithms, which has led to the innovation of the governance form. Then, the innovation of the governance form provides justification for the information processing behavior of platforms which seems to be neutral and objective but with a conflict between the private value orientation and the public governance function. Therefore, in order to regulate the information processing behavior of platforms, the rules of personal information protection should be fully incorporated under the premise of following the concept of system optimization, and constructing an information processing system that fits with the technical characteristics of this behavior. Secondly, the application of credit evaluation algorithms is the most prominent feature of personal credit scoring. The legal system of personal credit does not regulate the application of credit evaluation algorithm risks effectively. The legal system concerning the risk caused by artificial intelligence is also difficult to apply to the application of credit evaluation algorithms. For one thing, the existing product liability system is reasonable but lacks operability, which needs to be improved. For the other thing, the liability insurance system, in addition to facing many problems such as rate determination, is also contrary to the real needs of China, which should not be applied. The credit evaluation algorithm risks should be regulated through the integration of product liability and accounting laws and regulations in order to protect the knowledge, inquiry, objection, correction rights and the expected property 4 interests of individuals. The former focuses on filling the actual loss of individuals, while the latter focuses on protecting the expected interests of them. The product liability system should be reasonably transformed in two aspects of algorithm defect determination and burden of proof. The credit evaluation algorithm regulation needs to coordinate and cross different regulatory arrangements with a certain degree of algorithmic transparency as a guiding principle and the protection of human autonomy as a starting point. Finally, the application scenarios of personal credit scores are expanding, causing an emerging abuse problem. The abusive behaviors can be categorized into four types: fictitious credit by the individual, competition restriction by platforms, consumer credit fraud committed by the perpetrator, and abusive behaviors in digital credit co-regulation, involving five types of legal interests: personal information rights, platforms' economic interests, network transaction order, social credit level, and social and economic security. The scoring application behavior is difficult to be judicially bound by the following manifestations: such disputes are not classified into the corresponding causes, and judicial decisions are more often focused on other legal interests than the rights of personal information. The method of measuring interests in justice is to compare and evaluate the interests involved in the case. Treating platforms and the individual as equal civil subjects will inevitably leads to a bias in the scale of importance of interests. Simply relying on judicial remedies is not enough to protect interests of all parties. A process regulation structure must be built to organically integrate prior permission, intervention and post-event supervision, which consists of two parts. One is the need to adopt governance measures for digital market infrastructures for eligible platforms. Second is to build a pluralistic governance structure for the new personal credit market by fully engaging third-party supervisory agencies in cooperation with the personal information protection department, the People's Bank of China, the market supervision and administration department, and the anti-monopoly enforcement department.
  • dc.date.issued
  • 2026-03-31
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