CPTPP竞争政策研究

Research on CPTPP Competition Policy

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归属院系:

国际法学院

作者:

于良东

摘要:

《全面与进步跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》(CPTPP)是新一代高标准、严要求区域贸易协定的典型代表。随着英国的加入,CPTPP的影响力不再局限于亚太地区,更将辐射范围扩展到欧洲地区。经济发展规律表明,每当全球经济增速放缓或遭遇金融危机时,区域之间经济合作和国家之间经济合作便会在一定程度上得到加强,这一现象在东亚地区和亚太地区过去二十多年的合作中显得尤为明显。在百年未有之大变局加速演进、全球经济复苏缓慢,贸易增速动力不足,地缘政治冲突加剧的当下,CPTPP对于加强区域贸易合作,增强经济增长活力具有重要的现实意义。在当前新一代国际经贸规则的重塑过程中,《美墨加协定》(USMCA)以及《区域全面经济伙伴关系协定》(RCEP)等都已经生效。虽然不同的区域贸易协定在竞争政策方面各具特色,但是整体上都在朝着营造公平、自由的竞争环境迈进。CPTPP作为首次将竞争政策与国有企业和指定垄断独立开来、各自成章的区域贸易协定,无论是在竞争政策议题中的内容,还是在国有企业和指定垄断方面,都开创了历史之最,必将成为引领未来区域贸易协定制定的典范。其在竞争政策执法与合作方面赋予缔约方域外执法权、高标准的执法透明度、严要求的国有企业竞争规则,以及一改传统因竞争政策而产生的争端仅适用磋商的单一范式,开启了由单一范式向复合范式转变的新篇章,都预示着未来区域贸易协定的发展趋势。我国目前虽然已经初步形成了具有中国特色的竞争政策体系,并在积极推进落实公平竞争审查制度,建立全国统一大市场,但还无法实现与CPTPP中高标准的竞争政策同频共振。我国在竞争政策中执法的透明度、合作的深度以及国有企业竞争规则等方面相比CPTPP中竞争政策的要求,还存在一定的差距。虽然我国在2021年9月就已向CPTPP的保存方新西兰提交了加入申请,但是目前进展情况不容乐观,其中高标准严要求的竞争政策不可避免的会给我国带来巨大压力。为了对冲加入CPTPP对我国竞争政策带来的压力,本文通过对CPTPP竞争政策的研究,系统分析CPTPP中竞争政策的先进性与局限性,并将中国的竞争政策与CPTPP进行适配性分析,找出差距,探讨对策,为中国加入CPTPP提出竞争政策方面的思考与建议。虽然CPTPP将竞争政策规则和国有企业竞争规则作为两个章节独立开来,但是从本质内容来看,国有企业竞争规则仍属于竞争政策中的一部分。因此,将国有企业竞争规则也作为本文的研究对象。为系统阐释CPTPP竞争政策,本文主要聚焦CPTPP文本的第16章和17章以及第28章的部分内容,除去引言和后记,本文共分为五个章节,具体如下:第一章是CPTPP竞争政策概述。本章首先回顾了CPTPP从TPP以来的发展历程,通过对竞争政策基础理论以及不同经济理论对竞争政策目标影响的分析,概述了竞争政策从追求单一目标的范式向复合范式的演进历程。在对竞争政策理论分析的基础上,析出CPTPP竞争政策目标追求的是实现经济效率、提高消费者福利的复合范式。其次,在对CPTPP竞争政策特征进行总结后发现CPTPP中竞争政策规则正在向民主化演进,国有企业竞争规则正在不断强化以及争端解决适用的多元化。最后,CPTPP对竞争政策的促进发展与工业化进程密不可分。尤其是随着数字经济的到来,企业经营方式不断创新,数字革命使得企业经营行为的物理边界愈加模糊,竞争执法合作的需要愈加凸显,但由于CPTPP缔约方之间经济发展水平和文化差异较大,成员国竞争法尚未实现趋同化,CPTPP在竞争政策内容方面采取了软协调的进路,更多的从宏观方面和程序上进行规定,以寻求在竞争政策规则方面的最大公约数,实现缔约方之间未来竞争法的趋同化。第二章阐释了CPTPP竞争政策的协调与合作。鉴于竞争政策只能协调,竞争执法只能合作的美国一贯主张,本章标题确立为CPTPP竞争政策的协调与合作。首先,对国际合作以及国际竞争执法的理论进行了证成。其次,从竞争政策协调的重点即国家竞争法、私人诉权和消费者保护以及域外执法权进行了分析。一改以往传统,CPTPP并不是将重点放在对国家竞争法的定义上,而是将焦点放在对缔约方国家竞争法的尊重上,要求缔约方通过非歧视和透明度来实施国家竞争法。接着分析并阐述了竞争执法程序中的程序公正、非歧视和透明度、技术合作原则。分析发现CPTPP在竞争政策规则中通过维护和加强源自于世贸组织的非歧视和透明度的基本原则,来实现缔约方之间竞争法的融合。第三章论证了CPTPP的国有企业竞争规则。本章首先通过对国有企业适用竞争法的理论证成,对国有企业的界定进行了理论溯源,分析了国有企业在国际法不同体系中的认定标准不一,同一企业在一套标准下被认定为国有企业而在另一套标准下则可能被认定为私营企业从而遭遇不同的对待,不仅让相关成员方迷茫,也困惑着裁判者。因而国有企业的界定在国际法上有待统一标准。其次,通过对CPTPP中国有企业定义的解构发现,CPTPP中对国有企业定义从表面上来看是有所扩张,实质上是对国有企业的认定范围有所限缩。第三,CPTPP把从事商业活动作为认定国有企业的标准之一,并对商业活动进行了解释,同时规定必须由政府直接拥有50%以上所有权或控制权或拥有任命大多数董事的权力,忽视了间接拥有问题的存在,并在USMCA中对该定义进行了修订,这为中国加入CPTPP谈判留下了空间。第四,通过对CPTPP中国有企业竞争规则中的透明度、非歧视与商业考虑以及非商业援助规则的分析,发现CPTPP中高标准的透明度和信息披露义务、非歧视和商业考虑涵盖内容的丰富以及非商业援助规则的重塑尚属首创,为未来区域贸易协定擘画了蓝图。最后,CPTPP中国有企业的高标准规则从外部产生的压力,从某种程度上来讲可以减少中国国有企业国内改革的阻力,从而倒逼中国的国有企业改革。第四章探究了CPTPP竞争政策中的争端解决机制。本章分析了CPTPP竞争政策争端解决适用的相关问题。首先,通过对CPTPP文本相关内容的研究,发现CPTPP采取的竞争政策争端解决范式对于目前以及未来区域贸易协定中关于该议题的争端解决都具有巨大影响,很有可能成为未来区域贸易协定中相关议题争端解决的模版,USMCA就是很好的例证。其次,CPTPP中对竞争政策争端解决采取了两种进路,一种是因竞争政策规则而产生的争端排除了本协议项下一般争端解决的适用,仅适用磋商的单一范式解决;另一种进路是因非歧视待遇、商业考量和非商业援助而产生的争端赋予一般争端解决机制管辖权。再次,CPTPP对因竞争政策而产生的争端一改区域贸易协定中的单一解决范式的传统,采取的复合范式开启了目前区域贸易协定中解决该问题的新篇章。复次,在争端解决程序上,设置了特别的信息收集程序,是CPTPP对争端解决程序中的又一大创新。最后,通过分析CPTPP中争端解决机制中专家小组的组建程序,发现虽然表面上该争端解决机制提高了争端解决的效率,但由于理论上的漏洞,仍然摆脱不了像WTO上诉机构那样的厄运,使那些“恶意”阻挠专家小组组建的被诉缔约方得以具有可乘之机。虽然该理论上的漏洞可以得到弥补,但是从政治的角度来分析是非常困难的。由于CPTPP竞争政策争端解决范式尚属首创,并无过多经验可资借鉴,具体的实施效果如何,仍待未来实践进行检验。第五章探索了中国对接CPTPP完善竞争政策的路径。本章主要是针对本文第二、三、四章分析而产生的问题进行了一一回应,在CPTPP竞争政策下与我国竞争政策方面执行的情况进行适配性分析,提出我国加入CPTPP的谈判路径。首先,针对竞争政策方面进行了对策分析,提出了完善我国竞争政策体系建设,提升竞争政策执法透明度,深化竞争政策执法合作的建议;其次,在对接CPTPP国有企业竞争规则的方面提出了相关对策。通过对CPTPP中国有企业定义的解构,发现CPTPP国有企业定义中的间接所有或控制的罅隙,并提出我国在对国有企业改革时可充分利用该罅隙设计更为丰富多样化的股权结构以规避CPTPP高标准的国有企业竞争规则,为我国国有企业改革争取更长时间的过渡期,对冲加入CPTPP后我国国有企业受到其中高标准国有企业竞争规则的影响;再次,在竞争政策争端解决方面,通过分析目前我国对外加入自由贸易协定关于竞争政策议题的现状,发现我国在竞争政策议题下采取的争端解决范式较为单一,不仅不符合未来自由贸易协定的发展趋势,更无法与新一代国际经贸规则“同频共振”;最后,建议通过以RCEP大多边为“助推器”,以中日韩小多边为“减压阀”,有序对竞争政策产生的争端解决从单一范式到复合范式过渡。

语种:

中文

学科:

国际法学

提交日期

2024-06-14

引用参考

于良东. CPTPP竞争政策研究[D]. 西南政法大学,2024.

全文附件授权许可

知识共享许可协议-署名

  • dc.title
  • CPTPP竞争政策研究
  • dc.title
  • Research on CPTPP Competition Policy
  • dc.contributor.schoolno
  • B2021030109097
  • dc.contributor.author
  • 于良东
  • dc.contributor.affiliation
  • 国际法学院
  • dc.contributor.degree
  • 博士
  • dc.contributor.childdegree
  • 法学博士学位
  • dc.contributor.degreeConferringInstitution
  • 西南政法大学
  • dc.identifier.year
  • 2024
  • dc.contributor.direction
  • 国际经济法
  • dc.contributor.advisor
  • 岳树梅,唐青阳
  • dc.contributor.advisorAffiliation
  • 国际法学院,国际法学院
  • dc.language.iso
  • 中文
  • dc.subject
  • CPTPP,竞争政策,执法与合作,国有企业,争端解决范式
  • dc.subject
  • CPTPP;competition policy;Enforcement and Cooperation;state-owned enterprises;Dispute resolution paradigm; .
  • dc.description.abstract
  • 《全面与进步跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》(CPTPP)是新一代高标准、严要求区域贸易协定的典型代表。随着英国的加入,CPTPP的影响力不再局限于亚太地区,更将辐射范围扩展到欧洲地区。经济发展规律表明,每当全球经济增速放缓或遭遇金融危机时,区域之间经济合作和国家之间经济合作便会在一定程度上得到加强,这一现象在东亚地区和亚太地区过去二十多年的合作中显得尤为明显。在百年未有之大变局加速演进、全球经济复苏缓慢,贸易增速动力不足,地缘政治冲突加剧的当下,CPTPP对于加强区域贸易合作,增强经济增长活力具有重要的现实意义。在当前新一代国际经贸规则的重塑过程中,《美墨加协定》(USMCA)以及《区域全面经济伙伴关系协定》(RCEP)等都已经生效。虽然不同的区域贸易协定在竞争政策方面各具特色,但是整体上都在朝着营造公平、自由的竞争环境迈进。CPTPP作为首次将竞争政策与国有企业和指定垄断独立开来、各自成章的区域贸易协定,无论是在竞争政策议题中的内容,还是在国有企业和指定垄断方面,都开创了历史之最,必将成为引领未来区域贸易协定制定的典范。其在竞争政策执法与合作方面赋予缔约方域外执法权、高标准的执法透明度、严要求的国有企业竞争规则,以及一改传统因竞争政策而产生的争端仅适用磋商的单一范式,开启了由单一范式向复合范式转变的新篇章,都预示着未来区域贸易协定的发展趋势。我国目前虽然已经初步形成了具有中国特色的竞争政策体系,并在积极推进落实公平竞争审查制度,建立全国统一大市场,但还无法实现与CPTPP中高标准的竞争政策同频共振。我国在竞争政策中执法的透明度、合作的深度以及国有企业竞争规则等方面相比CPTPP中竞争政策的要求,还存在一定的差距。虽然我国在2021年9月就已向CPTPP的保存方新西兰提交了加入申请,但是目前进展情况不容乐观,其中高标准严要求的竞争政策不可避免的会给我国带来巨大压力。为了对冲加入CPTPP对我国竞争政策带来的压力,本文通过对CPTPP竞争政策的研究,系统分析CPTPP中竞争政策的先进性与局限性,并将中国的竞争政策与CPTPP进行适配性分析,找出差距,探讨对策,为中国加入CPTPP提出竞争政策方面的思考与建议。虽然CPTPP将竞争政策规则和国有企业竞争规则作为两个章节独立开来,但是从本质内容来看,国有企业竞争规则仍属于竞争政策中的一部分。因此,将国有企业竞争规则也作为本文的研究对象。为系统阐释CPTPP竞争政策,本文主要聚焦CPTPP文本的第16章和17章以及第28章的部分内容,除去引言和后记,本文共分为五个章节,具体如下:第一章是CPTPP竞争政策概述。本章首先回顾了CPTPP从TPP以来的发展历程,通过对竞争政策基础理论以及不同经济理论对竞争政策目标影响的分析,概述了竞争政策从追求单一目标的范式向复合范式的演进历程。在对竞争政策理论分析的基础上,析出CPTPP竞争政策目标追求的是实现经济效率、提高消费者福利的复合范式。其次,在对CPTPP竞争政策特征进行总结后发现CPTPP中竞争政策规则正在向民主化演进,国有企业竞争规则正在不断强化以及争端解决适用的多元化。最后,CPTPP对竞争政策的促进发展与工业化进程密不可分。尤其是随着数字经济的到来,企业经营方式不断创新,数字革命使得企业经营行为的物理边界愈加模糊,竞争执法合作的需要愈加凸显,但由于CPTPP缔约方之间经济发展水平和文化差异较大,成员国竞争法尚未实现趋同化,CPTPP在竞争政策内容方面采取了软协调的进路,更多的从宏观方面和程序上进行规定,以寻求在竞争政策规则方面的最大公约数,实现缔约方之间未来竞争法的趋同化。第二章阐释了CPTPP竞争政策的协调与合作。鉴于竞争政策只能协调,竞争执法只能合作的美国一贯主张,本章标题确立为CPTPP竞争政策的协调与合作。首先,对国际合作以及国际竞争执法的理论进行了证成。其次,从竞争政策协调的重点即国家竞争法、私人诉权和消费者保护以及域外执法权进行了分析。一改以往传统,CPTPP并不是将重点放在对国家竞争法的定义上,而是将焦点放在对缔约方国家竞争法的尊重上,要求缔约方通过非歧视和透明度来实施国家竞争法。接着分析并阐述了竞争执法程序中的程序公正、非歧视和透明度、技术合作原则。分析发现CPTPP在竞争政策规则中通过维护和加强源自于世贸组织的非歧视和透明度的基本原则,来实现缔约方之间竞争法的融合。第三章论证了CPTPP的国有企业竞争规则。本章首先通过对国有企业适用竞争法的理论证成,对国有企业的界定进行了理论溯源,分析了国有企业在国际法不同体系中的认定标准不一,同一企业在一套标准下被认定为国有企业而在另一套标准下则可能被认定为私营企业从而遭遇不同的对待,不仅让相关成员方迷茫,也困惑着裁判者。因而国有企业的界定在国际法上有待统一标准。其次,通过对CPTPP中国有企业定义的解构发现,CPTPP中对国有企业定义从表面上来看是有所扩张,实质上是对国有企业的认定范围有所限缩。第三,CPTPP把从事商业活动作为认定国有企业的标准之一,并对商业活动进行了解释,同时规定必须由政府直接拥有50%以上所有权或控制权或拥有任命大多数董事的权力,忽视了间接拥有问题的存在,并在USMCA中对该定义进行了修订,这为中国加入CPTPP谈判留下了空间。第四,通过对CPTPP中国有企业竞争规则中的透明度、非歧视与商业考虑以及非商业援助规则的分析,发现CPTPP中高标准的透明度和信息披露义务、非歧视和商业考虑涵盖内容的丰富以及非商业援助规则的重塑尚属首创,为未来区域贸易协定擘画了蓝图。最后,CPTPP中国有企业的高标准规则从外部产生的压力,从某种程度上来讲可以减少中国国有企业国内改革的阻力,从而倒逼中国的国有企业改革。第四章探究了CPTPP竞争政策中的争端解决机制。本章分析了CPTPP竞争政策争端解决适用的相关问题。首先,通过对CPTPP文本相关内容的研究,发现CPTPP采取的竞争政策争端解决范式对于目前以及未来区域贸易协定中关于该议题的争端解决都具有巨大影响,很有可能成为未来区域贸易协定中相关议题争端解决的模版,USMCA就是很好的例证。其次,CPTPP中对竞争政策争端解决采取了两种进路,一种是因竞争政策规则而产生的争端排除了本协议项下一般争端解决的适用,仅适用磋商的单一范式解决;另一种进路是因非歧视待遇、商业考量和非商业援助而产生的争端赋予一般争端解决机制管辖权。再次,CPTPP对因竞争政策而产生的争端一改区域贸易协定中的单一解决范式的传统,采取的复合范式开启了目前区域贸易协定中解决该问题的新篇章。复次,在争端解决程序上,设置了特别的信息收集程序,是CPTPP对争端解决程序中的又一大创新。最后,通过分析CPTPP中争端解决机制中专家小组的组建程序,发现虽然表面上该争端解决机制提高了争端解决的效率,但由于理论上的漏洞,仍然摆脱不了像WTO上诉机构那样的厄运,使那些“恶意”阻挠专家小组组建的被诉缔约方得以具有可乘之机。虽然该理论上的漏洞可以得到弥补,但是从政治的角度来分析是非常困难的。由于CPTPP竞争政策争端解决范式尚属首创,并无过多经验可资借鉴,具体的实施效果如何,仍待未来实践进行检验。第五章探索了中国对接CPTPP完善竞争政策的路径。本章主要是针对本文第二、三、四章分析而产生的问题进行了一一回应,在CPTPP竞争政策下与我国竞争政策方面执行的情况进行适配性分析,提出我国加入CPTPP的谈判路径。首先,针对竞争政策方面进行了对策分析,提出了完善我国竞争政策体系建设,提升竞争政策执法透明度,深化竞争政策执法合作的建议;其次,在对接CPTPP国有企业竞争规则的方面提出了相关对策。通过对CPTPP中国有企业定义的解构,发现CPTPP国有企业定义中的间接所有或控制的罅隙,并提出我国在对国有企业改革时可充分利用该罅隙设计更为丰富多样化的股权结构以规避CPTPP高标准的国有企业竞争规则,为我国国有企业改革争取更长时间的过渡期,对冲加入CPTPP后我国国有企业受到其中高标准国有企业竞争规则的影响;再次,在竞争政策争端解决方面,通过分析目前我国对外加入自由贸易协定关于竞争政策议题的现状,发现我国在竞争政策议题下采取的争端解决范式较为单一,不仅不符合未来自由贸易协定的发展趋势,更无法与新一代国际经贸规则“同频共振”;最后,建议通过以RCEP大多边为“助推器”,以中日韩小多边为“减压阀”,有序对竞争政策产生的争端解决从单一范式到复合范式过渡。
  • dc.description.abstract
  • The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is a typical representative of a new generation of high-standard and demanding regional trade agreements. With the accession of the United Kingdom to CPTPP, the influence of the CPTPP is no longer confined to the Asia-Pacific region but extends to the European region as well. Economic development trends indicate that whenever global economic growth slows down or faces financial crises, economic cooperation between regions and countries tends to strengthen to some extent. This phenomenon has been particularly evident in the cooperation within the East Asian and Asia-Pacific regions over the past two decades. In the current context of accelerated profound changes unseen in a century, slow global economic recovery, insufficient trade growth momentum, and escalating geopolitical conflicts, the CPTPP holds significant practical significance for strengthening regional trade cooperation and enhancing economic growth vitality.Amidst the reshaping of the new generation of international economic and trade rules, agreements such as the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) have already taken effect. Although different regional trade agreements have their own characteristics in competition policy, overall, they are all moving towards creating a fair and free competitive environment.The CPTPP, as the first regional trade agreement to separate competition policy from state-owned enterprises and designated monopolies into independent chapters, has set historical precedents both in the content of competition policy issues and in the areas of state-owned enterprises and designated monopolies. It is poised to become a model guiding the formulation of future regional trade agreements. Its provisions on competition policy enforcement and cooperation grant extraterritorial enforcement powers to the contracting parties, establish high standards of enforcement transparency, impose stringent rules on competition involving state-owned enterprises, and depart from the traditional paradigm where disputes arising from competition policies are resolved solely through negotiation. This shift from a singular paradigm to a composite paradigm heralds the development trend of future regional trade agreements.Although China has preliminarily developed a competition policy system with Chinese characteristics and actively promoted the implementation of a fair competition review system and the establishment of a unified national market, it has yet to resonate fully with the high standards of competition policy in the CPTPP. There are still certain gaps in areas such as the transparency of competition policy enforcement, the depth of cooperation, and the rules regarding state-owned enterprises compared to the requirements in the CPTPP competition policy. Despite China's submission of an application to join the CPTPP to its depositary, New Zealand, in September 2021, the current progress is not optimistic. The high standards and stringent requirements of competition policy are inevitably expected to bring significant pressure to China. In order to mitigate the pressure that joining the CPTPP will bring to China's competition policy, this paper conducts a systematic analysis of the advanced and limited aspects of competition policy within the CPTPP and conducts an adaptability analysis of China's competition policy with the CPTPP, identifies gaps, determines countermeasures, and proposes considerations and suggestions for China's participation in the CPTPP in terms of competition policy.Although the CPTPP separates competition policy and state-owned enterprises and designated monopolies into two distinct chapters, in essence, state-owned enterprises and designated monopolies still fall within the scope of competition policy. Therefore, the competition rules for state-owned enterprises are also the focus of this paper's research. In order to systematically expound on CPTPP competition policy, this paper primarily focuses on Chapters 16 and 17 of the CPTPP text as well as parts of Chapter 28. Excluding the introduction and conclusion, this paper is divided into five chapters as follows:Chapter One provides an overview of the CPTPP and competition policy. This chapter first reviews the development of the CPTPP since the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), outlines the evolution of competition policy from pursuing a single goal paradigm to a composite paradigm through an analysis of the basic theories of competition policy and the influence of different economic theories on competition policy objectives. Based on the analysis of competition policy theory, it is deduced that the objective of competition policy pursued by the CPTPP is to achieve economic efficiency and enhance consumer welfare in a composite paradigm. Secondly, after summarizing the characteristics of competition policy rules in the CPTPP, it is found that competition policy rules in the CPTPP are evolving towards democratization, strengthening of competition rules for state-owned enterprises, and diversification of dispute resolution. Finally, the promotion of competition policy by the CPTPP is closely intertwined with the industrialization process. Especially with the advent of the digital economy, business operations continue to innovate, and the digital revolution blurs the physical boundaries of business operations. The need for competition law enforcement cooperation becomes more prominent. However, due to the significant differences in economic development levels and cultural differences among the contracting parties of the CPTPP, the competition laws of member states have not yet achieved convergence. The CPTPP adopts a soft-coordination approach in terms of competition policy content, focusing more on macro aspects and procedures to seek the maximum common denominator in competition policy rules and achieve convergence of competition laws among the contracting parties in the future.Chapter Two elaborates on the coordination and cooperation of competition policy in the CPTPP. Given the consistent advocacy by the United States that competition policy can only be coordinated and competition enforcement can only be cooperative, this chapter is titled “Coordination and Cooperation of Competition Policy in the CPTPP”. Firstly, the theoretical basis of international cooperation and international competition enforcement is established. Secondly, an analysis is conducted on the focus of competition policy coordination, including national competition laws, private rights of action, consumer protection, and extraterritorial enforcement. Departing from tradition, the CPTPP does not focus solely on defining national competition laws but emphasizes respecting the national competition laws of the contracting parties, requiring them to implement national competition laws through non-discrimination and transparency. Furthermore, the analysis and elaboration of procedural fairness, non-discrimination and transparency, and technical cooperation principles in competition law enforcement procedures reveal that the CPTPP aims to integrate competition laws among the contracting parties by upholding and strengthening the basic principles of non-discrimination and transparency of the World Trade Organization. Chapter Three argues the rules of competition for state-owned enterprises in the CPTPP. Firstly, through theoretical analysis of the application of competition law to state-owned enterprises, the theoretical origins of defining state-owned enterprises are traced, and the analysis of different recognition standards for state-owned enterprises in various international legal systems reveals inconsistencies. The same enterprise may be recognized as state-owned enterprise under one set of standards and as a private enterprise under another, leading to confusion among relevant members and perplexity for adjudicators. Therefore, the definition of state-owned enterprises in international law awaits unified standards. Secondly, through deconstructing the definition of state-owned enterprises in the CPTPP, it is discovered that while the definition of state-owned enterprises in the CPTPP appears to be expanded on the surface, it actually restricts the scope of recognition of state-owned enterprises. Thirdly, the CPTPP considers engaging in commercial activities as one of the criteria for identifying state-owned enterprises and provides an explanation of commercial activities. It also stipulates that a government must directly own or control more than 50% of the shares or have the power to appoint a majority of directors, disregarding the existence of indirect ownership issues. This definition has been revised in the USMCA, leaving room for negotiation for China to join the CPTPP. Fourthly, through analysis of transparency, non-discrimination, and commercial considerations in the competition rules for state-owned enterprises in the CPTPP, it is found that the high standards of transparency and disclosure obligations, the richness of content covered by non-discrimination and commercial considerations, and the reshaping of non-commercial assistance rules in the CPTPP are innovative, outlining a blueprint for future regional trade agreements. Finally, the high standard rules for state-owned enterprises in the CPTPP create external pressure, which can, to some extent, reduce resistance to domestic reforms of Chinese state-owned enterprises, thereby urging reforms in China's state-owned enterprises.Chapter Four explores the dispute resolution mechanism in the CPTPP competition policy. This chapter analyzes relevant issues regarding the application of dispute resolution mechanisms in the CPTPP competition policy. Firstly, through the study of relevant contents of the CPTPP text, it is found that the dispute resolution paradigm adopted by the CPTPP for competition policy disputes has a significant impact on current and future dispute resolutions on this topic in regional trade agreements, making it likely to become a template for resolving related disputes in future regional trade agreements, as evidenced by the USMCA. Secondly, the CPTPP adopts two approaches to resolving competition policy disputes: disputes arising from competition policy rules exclude the application of general dispute resolution under this Agreement and are resolved through a single-paradigm of negotiation; disputes arising from non-discrimination, commercial considerations, and non-commercial assistance grant jurisdiction to the general dispute resolution mechanism. Thirdly, the CPTPP departs from the traditional single resolution paradigm in regional trade agreements for disputes arising from competition policy, opting for a composite paradigm, opening a new chapter in resolving this issue in current regional trade agreements. Furthermore, in dispute resolution procedures, special information-gathering procedures have been established, representing another major innovation in dispute resolution procedures by the CPTPP. Finally, by analyzing the formation procedure of expert groups in the dispute resolution mechanism of the CPTPP, it is found that although this dispute resolution mechanism ostensibly improves the efficiency of dispute resolution, it still cannot escape the fate of the WTO Appellate Body due to theoretical loopholes, allowing respondent contracting parties who “maliciously”obstruct the formation of expert groups to take advantage. Although these theoretical loopholes can be remedied, it is politically challenging to analyze them from a political perspective. Since the dispute resolution paradigm of competition policy in the CPTPP is still innovative and lacks much experience to draw upon, the specific implementation effects remain to be tested by future practice.Chapter Five explores the path for China to align its competition policy with the CPTPP. This chapter mainly responds to the issues generated by the analysis in Chapters Two, Three, and Four, conducts an adaptability analysis of China's competition policy with the CPTPP competition policy, and proposes negotiation pathways for China to join the CPTPP. Firstly, countermeasure analysis is conducted for competition policy, proposing improvements to China's competition policy system, enhancing the transparency of competition policy enforcement, and making recommendations for deepening competition policy enforcement cooperation. Secondly, relevant countermeasures are proposed for aligning with CPTPP state-owned enterprise competition rules. Through deconstruction of the definition of state-owned enterprises in the CPTPP, it is discovered that there are gaps in indirect ownership or control in the definition of state-owned enterprises in the CPTPP, and it is proposed that China can fully utilize these gaps in designing a more diverse equity structure to circumvent the high standard state-owned enterprise rules of the CPTPP, thereby seeking a longer transition period for China's state-owned enterprise reform and mitigating the impact of the high standard state-owned enterprise rules on China's state-owned enterprise reform after joining the CPTPP. Thirdly, in terms of competition policy dispute resolution, through an analysis of the current situation of China's participation in free trade agreements on competition policy issues, it is found that China's dispute resolution paradigm under competition policy is relatively single, not only inconsistent with the development trend of future free trade agreements but also unable to resonate with the new generation of international economic and trade rules. Finally, it is suggested to use the RCEP multilateral as a “booster” and the China-Japan-Korea trilateral as a “pressure relief valve” to transition from a single-paradigm to a composite-paradigm for dispute resolution arising from competition policy in an orderly manner.
  • dc.date.issued
  • 2024-06-05
  • dc.date.oralDefense
  • 2024-05-31
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