证券中介机构市场监督功能发挥的保障机制研究

Study on the Safeguard Mechanism for the Performance of Market Supervision Functions of Securities Intermediaries

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归属院系:

商学院

作者:

刘夏青

摘要:

新《证券法》设立专章规定信息披露和投资者保护,凸显出上市公司信息披露制度和中小投资者权益保护在资本市场中的重要性。资本市场是信息驱动的,有效的信息传递是资本市场充分发挥资源配置功能的重要保障,鉴于证券市场的复杂性和专业性,中小投资者在权利自我保护上的经验、投入和主动性不足,天生处于信息劣势地位。证券中介机构作为资本市场的法定“看门人”,应勤勉尽责以解决信息不对称、降低交易成本和保护投资者利益为职业追求。然而,当前证券中介机构监督机制依然不够成熟,实践中部分证券中介机构未能有效发挥监督功能纯化资本市场信息,类如中介机构角色定位不协调、现行中介机构选聘机制不完善及中介机构义务责任不匹配现象导致的中介监督失效问题频繁发生。这些议题未完全得到学界的充分重视,还存在诸多需要进一步廓清与完善之处。有鉴于此,本文尝试从历史溯源、现状分析与制度完善三个维度对证券中介监督制度展开研究,试图在理清证券中介监督制度产生的历史背景和实践现状的基础上,挖掘证券中介机构监督失效的制度成因并提出保障证券中介机构有效发挥监督功能的完善思路。在具体内容安排上,本文主要划分为以下五个部分:第一章,证券中介机构监督功能的兴起。本部分梳理了证券中介机构市场功能的演进历程并对相关概念理论进行了阐释。具体而言,以历史溯源的方式梳理了注册会计师和证券律师市场功能的演变历程,采用语义分析法从概念中挖掘中介监督的本质和相关机制,最后阐释了证券中介机构监督制度衍生的理论基础。具体而言,主要从证券中介机构的功能演进、核心内涵和理论选择三个方面展开论述。首先,通过回顾域内外注册会计师、证券律师角色和功能演变的过程,梳理出证券中介机构的监督功能和服务功能自始存在,只是资本市场在不同发展时期对证券中介机构的需求不同所呈现出服务功能和监督功能交替式占据证券中介机构主流业务的特点,由此得出在资本市场失信的现状下,中介机构的应然功能定位是从事审核类业务履行监督功能。其次,从理论层面剖析证券中介机构的概念、本质与约束机制,并立足于“看门人”的角色职能要求和法律经济分析法视角,提出实然层面中介机构屡次默许上市公司的欺诈行为与证券中介机构理应保护投资者利益的应然定位存在背离。最后,通过对证券中介机构监督功能的相关理论进行论证。指出“看门人”理论的现实局限性和“追首恶”理论的正当性,并依据证券市场的现状和需求提出我国中介监督的理论进路。第二章,证券中介机构监督功能的现实状况。本部分主要从制度现状、运行现状和制度成因三节展开叙述。第一节梳理了证券中介机构监督制度的发展历史和立法现状,归纳出注册会计师和证券律师等中介机构监督功能的制度现状及缺陷;第二节描绘了证券中介机构监督功能的行政监管和司法实践现状,并利用博弈论分析法对中介机构监督策略和上市公司是否欺诈做出定量分析。具体而言,利用证监会的行政处罚书和司法裁判文书对注册会计师和证券律师监督失效的处罚现状进行汇总分析,发现中介机构在从事审核类业务时存在工作程序、底稿缺失、未勤勉尽责出具的鉴证报告中存在虚假陈述等问题,即证券中介机构在发挥监督功能上存在实然与应然的背离。进一步地,指出角色定位不协调和义务责任不完善是造成这一局面的根本原因,并利用博弈论对中介机构监督和上市公司欺诈行为所形成的序贯博弈过程进行剖析,提出切断中介机构与上市公司间的聘任关系也是保障中介机构发挥监督功能的关键。第三节在制度和运行现状的基础上提炼出引发证券中介机构监督失效的三个制度成因。概言之,本部分通过实证分析法归纳出证券中介机构的监督责任义务不匹配;利用历史溯源法归纳出中介机构发挥监督功能时存在角色定位不协调问题;利用博弈分析法提出现行中介选聘机制存在局限性。第三章,保障监督功能的证券中介机构角色定位调适。本部分对中介机构角色冲突问题进行深入分析,分为角色冲突的成因分析、证券中介角色冲突的调适路径和调适角色冲突的具体措施三部分。首先,咨询/审计业务收入差距过大和行业竞争强度不足是诱发证券中介机构角色冲突的外因,委托代理关系下证券中介机构的代理人身份与资本市场看门人身份交织以及咨询和审核业务交织是角色冲突的内因。其次,以宏观视角对证券中介角色冲突的调适路径进行展望,提出作为“理性经济人”的中介机构为追求“利益最大化”目标在上市公司与投资者之间做出的自利选择是其存在角色冲突的本质原因,在此认知基础上,从行政监管和民事诉讼两个层面提出中介机构角色冲突的规制路径,最后,提出调适证券中介机构角色冲突的具体措施,即通过转变资本市场的中介机构付费模式、建立证券中介机构监督评估体系、加大中介行业检查力度构建同业举报制度和提升声誉资本的约束作用四个方面对中介角色冲突问题进行调适以保障中介机构监督功能的实现。第四章,保障监督功能的证券中介机构选聘机制优化。本部分讨论证券中介机构选聘机制不完善及配套机制优化的问题,主要从证券中介选聘模式及现存缺陷、监督理念下的证券中介选聘模式和保障证券机构监督功能的配套机制三部分展开讨论。具体而言,首先,对证券中介机构的职责、选聘原则和现存缺陷进行剖析,描绘出中介选聘机制的应然状态;其次,基于监督理念对主流中介选聘模式进行对比评析,并对上述中介选聘模式的本质进行类型化解释。即现行中介选聘机制分为公司治理机构选聘模式,监管机构选聘模式和社会机构选聘模式三类,探讨不同模式在我国证券市场环境下的适用性,提出三种模式存在不同程度的缺陷,均不符合我国证券中介选聘机制构建的标准。最后,为保障证券中介机构选聘机制的优化和监督功能的实现,还需构建相应的配套措施如先行赔付制度、行业自治机制和事前预防机制,以实现对中介机构监督制度失效的防范和救济,凸显事前多元化纠纷解决和投资者保护的理念。第五章,保障监督功能的证券中介机构义务责任完善。本部分探讨诱发中介机构监督失效的义务责任不完善问题,主要从证券中介机构的勤勉尽责义务、证券中介机构监督功能的法律责任配置、证券中介监督失效的责任认定标准改进和证券中介机构的义务责任完善建议四部分进行论述。首先,通过勤勉尽责义务的存在逻辑、法理基础、合理标准和尽责样态勾勒出证券中介机构的勤勉尽责义务边界。其次,从证券中介机构监督功能的法律责任配置逻辑、配置原则和配置局限三方面对证券中介机构法律责任进行重新配置,并针对行政监管的处罚力度和中介连带责任的合理性展开讨论。再次,以行政监管中的形式审查和司法实践中的实质判断为抓手对引发证券中介机构监督失效的连带责任过重和失信成本过低问题进行深入剖析,并立足于《最高人民法院关于审理证券市场虚假陈述侵权民事赔偿案件的若干规定》,探讨我国司法实践和行政监管在保障中介机构监督功能实现上的理论可行性和政策衔接性。最后,提出保障证券中介机构监督功能的义务责任完善建议。即搭建“合作减免制度”以廓清勤勉尽责标准的边界,为中介机构承担过错提供精确度量标准;以超额累积税率征收模式对中介机构违法所得进行处罚,并借鉴域外中介机构侵权民事责任形态之经验,引入比例连带责任或修正的连带责任形态建构具有中国特色的证券侵权损害赔偿责任机制。

语种:

中文

学科:

民商法学

提交日期

2024-01-10

引用参考

刘夏青. 证券中介机构市场监督功能发挥的保障机制研究[D]. 西南政法大学,2023.

  • dc.title
  • 证券中介机构市场监督功能发挥的保障机制研究
  • dc.title
  • Study on the Safeguard Mechanism for the Performance of Market Supervision Functions of Securities Intermediaries
  • dc.contributor.schoolno
  • B2020030105054
  • dc.contributor.author
  • 刘夏青
  • dc.contributor.affiliation
  • 商学院
  • dc.contributor.degree
  • 博士
  • dc.contributor.childdegree
  • 法学博士
  • dc.contributor.degreeConferringInstitution
  • 西南政法大学
  • dc.identifier.year
  • 2023
  • dc.contributor.direction
  • 证券法
  • dc.contributor.advisor
  • 韩炜,汪青松
  • dc.contributor.advisorAffiliation
  • 商学院,民商法学院
  • dc.language.iso
  • 中文
  • dc.subject
  • 证券中介机构;市场监督功能;中介角色冲突调适;选聘分离聘任机制;过责相当
  • dc.subject
  • Securities Intermediaries;Market Surveillance Function;Intermediary Role Conflict Adjustment;Selection and Hiring of Separate Appointment Mechanism;Equivalent Faults and Responsibilities
  • dc.description.abstract
  • 新《证券法》设立专章规定信息披露和投资者保护,凸显出上市公司信息披露制度和中小投资者权益保护在资本市场中的重要性。资本市场是信息驱动的,有效的信息传递是资本市场充分发挥资源配置功能的重要保障,鉴于证券市场的复杂性和专业性,中小投资者在权利自我保护上的经验、投入和主动性不足,天生处于信息劣势地位。证券中介机构作为资本市场的法定“看门人”,应勤勉尽责以解决信息不对称、降低交易成本和保护投资者利益为职业追求。然而,当前证券中介机构监督机制依然不够成熟,实践中部分证券中介机构未能有效发挥监督功能纯化资本市场信息,类如中介机构角色定位不协调、现行中介机构选聘机制不完善及中介机构义务责任不匹配现象导致的中介监督失效问题频繁发生。这些议题未完全得到学界的充分重视,还存在诸多需要进一步廓清与完善之处。有鉴于此,本文尝试从历史溯源、现状分析与制度完善三个维度对证券中介监督制度展开研究,试图在理清证券中介监督制度产生的历史背景和实践现状的基础上,挖掘证券中介机构监督失效的制度成因并提出保障证券中介机构有效发挥监督功能的完善思路。在具体内容安排上,本文主要划分为以下五个部分:第一章,证券中介机构监督功能的兴起。本部分梳理了证券中介机构市场功能的演进历程并对相关概念理论进行了阐释。具体而言,以历史溯源的方式梳理了注册会计师和证券律师市场功能的演变历程,采用语义分析法从概念中挖掘中介监督的本质和相关机制,最后阐释了证券中介机构监督制度衍生的理论基础。具体而言,主要从证券中介机构的功能演进、核心内涵和理论选择三个方面展开论述。首先,通过回顾域内外注册会计师、证券律师角色和功能演变的过程,梳理出证券中介机构的监督功能和服务功能自始存在,只是资本市场在不同发展时期对证券中介机构的需求不同所呈现出服务功能和监督功能交替式占据证券中介机构主流业务的特点,由此得出在资本市场失信的现状下,中介机构的应然功能定位是从事审核类业务履行监督功能。其次,从理论层面剖析证券中介机构的概念、本质与约束机制,并立足于“看门人”的角色职能要求和法律经济分析法视角,提出实然层面中介机构屡次默许上市公司的欺诈行为与证券中介机构理应保护投资者利益的应然定位存在背离。最后,通过对证券中介机构监督功能的相关理论进行论证。指出“看门人”理论的现实局限性和“追首恶”理论的正当性,并依据证券市场的现状和需求提出我国中介监督的理论进路。第二章,证券中介机构监督功能的现实状况。本部分主要从制度现状、运行现状和制度成因三节展开叙述。第一节梳理了证券中介机构监督制度的发展历史和立法现状,归纳出注册会计师和证券律师等中介机构监督功能的制度现状及缺陷;第二节描绘了证券中介机构监督功能的行政监管和司法实践现状,并利用博弈论分析法对中介机构监督策略和上市公司是否欺诈做出定量分析。具体而言,利用证监会的行政处罚书和司法裁判文书对注册会计师和证券律师监督失效的处罚现状进行汇总分析,发现中介机构在从事审核类业务时存在工作程序、底稿缺失、未勤勉尽责出具的鉴证报告中存在虚假陈述等问题,即证券中介机构在发挥监督功能上存在实然与应然的背离。进一步地,指出角色定位不协调和义务责任不完善是造成这一局面的根本原因,并利用博弈论对中介机构监督和上市公司欺诈行为所形成的序贯博弈过程进行剖析,提出切断中介机构与上市公司间的聘任关系也是保障中介机构发挥监督功能的关键。第三节在制度和运行现状的基础上提炼出引发证券中介机构监督失效的三个制度成因。概言之,本部分通过实证分析法归纳出证券中介机构的监督责任义务不匹配;利用历史溯源法归纳出中介机构发挥监督功能时存在角色定位不协调问题;利用博弈分析法提出现行中介选聘机制存在局限性。第三章,保障监督功能的证券中介机构角色定位调适。本部分对中介机构角色冲突问题进行深入分析,分为角色冲突的成因分析、证券中介角色冲突的调适路径和调适角色冲突的具体措施三部分。首先,咨询/审计业务收入差距过大和行业竞争强度不足是诱发证券中介机构角色冲突的外因,委托代理关系下证券中介机构的代理人身份与资本市场看门人身份交织以及咨询和审核业务交织是角色冲突的内因。其次,以宏观视角对证券中介角色冲突的调适路径进行展望,提出作为“理性经济人”的中介机构为追求“利益最大化”目标在上市公司与投资者之间做出的自利选择是其存在角色冲突的本质原因,在此认知基础上,从行政监管和民事诉讼两个层面提出中介机构角色冲突的规制路径,最后,提出调适证券中介机构角色冲突的具体措施,即通过转变资本市场的中介机构付费模式、建立证券中介机构监督评估体系、加大中介行业检查力度构建同业举报制度和提升声誉资本的约束作用四个方面对中介角色冲突问题进行调适以保障中介机构监督功能的实现。第四章,保障监督功能的证券中介机构选聘机制优化。本部分讨论证券中介机构选聘机制不完善及配套机制优化的问题,主要从证券中介选聘模式及现存缺陷、监督理念下的证券中介选聘模式和保障证券机构监督功能的配套机制三部分展开讨论。具体而言,首先,对证券中介机构的职责、选聘原则和现存缺陷进行剖析,描绘出中介选聘机制的应然状态;其次,基于监督理念对主流中介选聘模式进行对比评析,并对上述中介选聘模式的本质进行类型化解释。即现行中介选聘机制分为公司治理机构选聘模式,监管机构选聘模式和社会机构选聘模式三类,探讨不同模式在我国证券市场环境下的适用性,提出三种模式存在不同程度的缺陷,均不符合我国证券中介选聘机制构建的标准。最后,为保障证券中介机构选聘机制的优化和监督功能的实现,还需构建相应的配套措施如先行赔付制度、行业自治机制和事前预防机制,以实现对中介机构监督制度失效的防范和救济,凸显事前多元化纠纷解决和投资者保护的理念。第五章,保障监督功能的证券中介机构义务责任完善。本部分探讨诱发中介机构监督失效的义务责任不完善问题,主要从证券中介机构的勤勉尽责义务、证券中介机构监督功能的法律责任配置、证券中介监督失效的责任认定标准改进和证券中介机构的义务责任完善建议四部分进行论述。首先,通过勤勉尽责义务的存在逻辑、法理基础、合理标准和尽责样态勾勒出证券中介机构的勤勉尽责义务边界。其次,从证券中介机构监督功能的法律责任配置逻辑、配置原则和配置局限三方面对证券中介机构法律责任进行重新配置,并针对行政监管的处罚力度和中介连带责任的合理性展开讨论。再次,以行政监管中的形式审查和司法实践中的实质判断为抓手对引发证券中介机构监督失效的连带责任过重和失信成本过低问题进行深入剖析,并立足于《最高人民法院关于审理证券市场虚假陈述侵权民事赔偿案件的若干规定》,探讨我国司法实践和行政监管在保障中介机构监督功能实现上的理论可行性和政策衔接性。最后,提出保障证券中介机构监督功能的义务责任完善建议。即搭建“合作减免制度”以廓清勤勉尽责标准的边界,为中介机构承担过错提供精确度量标准;以超额累积税率征收模式对中介机构违法所得进行处罚,并借鉴域外中介机构侵权民事责任形态之经验,引入比例连带责任或修正的连带责任形态建构具有中国特色的证券侵权损害赔偿责任机制。
  • dc.description.abstract
  • The new Securities Law establishes a special chapter on information disclosure and investor protection, highlighting the importance of the information disclosure system for listed companies and the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors in the capital market. The capital market is information-driven, and effective information transmission is an important guarantee for the capital market to give full play to the function of resource allocation. In view of the complexity and professionalism of the securities market, small and medium-sized investors are inherently at an information disadvantage because of their insufficient experience, input and initiative in self-protection of their rights. As the legal "gatekeepers" of the capital market, securities intermediaries should diligently pursue the professional pursuit of resolving information asymmetry, reducing transaction costs and protecting investors' interests. However, the current supervision mechanism of securities intermediaries is still not mature enough, and in practice, some securities intermediaries have failed to effectively play their supervisory function to purify the information of the capital market, such as intermediaries with uncoordinated roles, imperfect mechanisms for selecting and hiring existing intermediaries, and mismatch of intermediaries' obligations and responsibilities, leading to frequent intermediary supervision failures. These issues have not received sufficient attention from the academic community, and there are still many areas that need to be further clarified and improved. In view of this, this paper attempts to study the securities intermediary supervision system from the historical origin, current situation analysis and system improvement in three dimensions, trying to clarify the historical background of the securities intermediary supervision system and the practice of the current situation, on the basis of digging out the securities intermediary supervision of the failure of the system causes and put forward to ensure that securities intermediaries effectively play the supervisory function of the improvement of the idea. In terms of specific content arrangement, this paper is mainly divided into the following five parts:Chapter 1, The Rise of the Supervisory Function of Securities Intermediaries. This part combs through the evolution of the market function of securities intermediaries and explains the relevant conceptual theories. Specifically, it traces the evolution of the market functions of certified public accountants and securities lawyers through history, employs semantic analysis to dig out the essence of intermediary supervision and related mechanisms from the concepts, and finally explains the theoretical basis for the derivation of the supervision system of securities intermediaries. Specifically, the discussion mainly focuses on three aspects: the evolution of the functions of securities intermediaries, the core connotation and the theoretical choices. Firstly, by reviewing the evolution of the roles and functions of certified public accountants and securities lawyers both inside and outside the region, it is sorted out that the supervisory and service functions of securities intermediaries have existed since the beginning of time, and it is only that the different demands of the capital market for securities intermediaries in different periods of development have presented the characteristics of the service function and supervisory function that have alternately occupied the mainstream business of the securities intermediaries, and it is thus concluded that, in the current situation of the capital market's breach of trust, the It is thus concluded that under the current situation of capital market distrust, the natural function of intermediaries is to engage in auditing business to fulfil the supervisory function. Secondly, from the theoretical level, we analyse the concept, essence and constraint mechanism of securities intermediaries, and based on the requirements of the role and function of "gatekeeper" and the perspective of legal and economic analysis, we propose that there is a deviation from the actual level of intermediaries' repeated acquiescence to fraudulent behaviours of listed companies, and that securities intermediaries are supposed to protect the interests of investors as a matter of course. Finally, it is argued through the theory related to the supervisory function of securities intermediaries. It points out the practical limitations of the theory of "gatekeeper" and the legitimacy of the theory of "chasing the first evil", and puts forward the theoretical way forward for the supervision of intermediaries in China according to the current situation and needs of the securities market.Chapter 2, The reality of the supervisory function of securities intermediaries. This part of the main system from the current situation, the operation of the current situation and the causes of the system in three sections to develop the narrative. The first section combs through the development history and legislative status of the securities intermediary supervision system, and summarises the institutional status and deficiencies of the supervision function of intermediaries such as CPAs and securities lawyers; the second section depicts the current status of the administrative supervision and judicial practice of the supervision function of securities intermediaries, and makes quantitative analyses of the intermediary supervision strategy and whether listed companies are fraudulent by using game theoretic analyses. Specifically, a summary analysis of the current status of penalties for supervisory failures of certified public accountants and securities lawyers using administrative penalties of the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) and judicial rulings reveals that intermediaries engage in auditing-type business with problems such as working procedures, missing manuscripts, and misrepresentations in forensic reports issued without diligence, i.e., there is a deviation of the actual from the deserved in the exercise of the supervisory function by securities intermediaries. Further, it is pointed out that the uncoordinated role positioning and imperfect obligations and responsibilities are the root causes of this situation, and the sequential game process formed by intermediaries' supervision and listed companies' fraudulent behaviours is analysed by using game theory, and it is proposed that cutting off the appointment relationship between intermediaries and listed companies is also the key to guaranteeing intermediaries to play the supervisory function. The third section extracts the three institutional causes of the failure of securities intermediaries' supervision on the basis of the institutional and operational status quo. In summary, this part summarises the mismatch between the supervisory responsibilities and obligations of securities intermediaries through empirical analysis; summarises the problem of role mismatch in the performance of the supervisory function of intermediaries by using historical traceability; and proposes the limitations of the current intermediary selection and hiring mechanism by using game analysis.Chapter 3, the role of securities intermediaries to safeguard the function of supervision and adjustment. This part provides an in-depth analysis of the role conflict problem of intermediaries, which is divided into three parts: the analysis of the causes of role conflict, the adjustment path of securities intermediary role conflict and the specific measures for the adjustment of role conflict. Firstly, the excessive income gap between consulting/auditing business and the insufficient competitive intensity of the industry are the external causes inducing the role conflict of securities intermediaries, while the intertwining of the agent status of securities intermediaries and the status of the gatekeeper of the capital market under the principal-agent relationship, as well as the intertwining of the consulting and auditing business, are the internal causes of the role conflict. Secondly, we look forward to the adjustment path of securities intermediaries' role conflict from a macro perspective, and propose that the self-interested choices made by intermediaries as "rational economic beings" in pursuit of the goal of "profit maximisation" between listed companies and investors are the essential reasons for their role conflict. On the basis of this knowledge, the regulatory path of intermediaries' role conflict is proposed from the levels of administrative supervision and civil litigation, and finally, the specific measures for adjusting the role conflict of securities intermediaries are proposed, i.e., through transforming the intermediaries' payment mode in the capital market, establishing the supervisory and evaluation system of securities intermediaries, increasing the inspection of intermediaries to build a peer reporting system, and enhancing the constraints of the reputational capital. The four aspects of the intermediary role conflict problem are adapted to ensure the realisation of the intermediary's supervisory function.Chapter 4: Optimisation of the mechanism for the selection and recruitment of securities intermediaries to safeguard the supervisory function. This part discusses the imperfections of the selection and recruitment mechanism of securities intermediaries and the optimisation of the supporting mechanism, mainly from the three parts of the securities intermediary selection and recruitment model and existing defects, the securities intermediary selection and recruitment model under the concept of supervision, and the supporting mechanism of safeguarding the supervisory function of securities institutions. Specifically, firstly, the duties, selection principles and existing defects of securities intermediaries are analysed to depict the contingent state of the intermediary selection mechanism; secondly, the mainstream intermediary selection modes are compared and evaluated based on the supervision concept, and the essence of the above intermediary selection modes is explained in a typological manner. That is, the current intermediary selection mechanism is divided into three categories, namely, the corporate governance body selection model, the regulatory body selection model and the social agency selection model, and discusses the applicability of different models in China's securities market environment, and proposes that the three models have different degrees of defects, and none of them meets the standards for the construction of China's securities intermediary selection mechanism. Finally, in order to guarantee the optimisation of the selection and hiring mechanism of securities intermediaries and the realisation of their supervisory functions, it is also necessary to construct corresponding supporting measures such as an early compensation system, an industry autonomy mechanism and an ex-ante preventive mechanism, so as to realise the prevention of and relief from the failure of the supervisory system of the intermediaries, and to bring to the fore the concepts of ex-ante diversified dispute resolution and investor protection.Chapter 5, Improvement of the obligations and responsibilities of securities intermediaries to safeguard the supervisory function. This part discusses the imperfection of obligation and responsibility that induces the failure of supervision of intermediary institutions, mainly from the obligation of diligence and due diligence of securities intermediary institutions, the configuration of legal responsibility of the supervision function of securities intermediary institutions, the improvement of the responsibility determination standard of the failure of supervision of securities intermediary institutions, and the suggestion of the improvement of the obligation and responsibility of securities intermediary institutions in four parts. Firstly, it outlines the boundaries of the diligence obligation of securities intermediaries through the existence logic, legal basis, reasonable standard and due diligence pattern of the diligence obligation. Secondly, the legal responsibility of securities intermediaries is reconfigured in terms of the logic, principles and limitations of the legal responsibility of the supervisory function of securities intermediaries, and the reasonableness of the penalty of administrative supervision and the joint and several liability of intermediaries are discussed. Once again, we take the formal review in administrative supervision and the substantive judgement in judicial practice as the key to analyse the problems of excessive joint and several liability and low cost of breach of trust that trigger the failure of supervision of securities intermediaries, and based on the Several Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on the Hearing of Civil Compensation Cases of Misrepresentation Infringement in the Securities Market, we discuss the theoretical feasibility and policy convergence of judicial practice and administrative supervision in China in guaranteeing the realization of the supervision function of the intermediaries. Theoretical feasibility and policy articulation. Finally, it puts forward a proposal to improve the duty and responsibility of safeguarding the supervisory function of securities intermediaries. That is, to build a "co-operation relief system" to clarify the boundaries of the standard of due diligence and provide precise measurement standards for the intermediaries to bear the fault; to penalise the intermediaries' illegal income by the mode of excess cumulative tax rate levy, and to introduce the proportional joint and several liability or the modified joint and several liability by drawing on the experience of the civil liability of intermediary infringement in the extra-territorial region. Constructing a liability mechanism for securities infringement damages with Chinese characteristics.
  • dc.date.issued
  • 2023-11-22
  • dc.date.oralDefense
  • 2023-11-17
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