How does institutional investors' information acquisition inhibit share pledging? Evidence from China

传播影响力
本库下载频次:
本库浏览频次:
CNKI下载频次:0

归属学者:

肖忠意

归属院系:

商学院 ; 经济学院

作者:

Xiao, Zhongyi1,2 ; Chen, Haitao ; Chen, Kang

摘要:

This study investigates whether and how institutional investors' information acquisition affects controlling shareholder's share pledging. Taking a unique data of institutional investors' corporate site visits in China, we find that institutional investors' corporate site visits significantly inhibit controlling shareholder's share pledging. This effect is robust to a series of robustness checks, including controlling for endogeneity concerns, propensity score matching method, alternative model specifications, and alternative measures of the independent variable. We then provide evidence that the negative relation between institutional investors' corporate site visits and controlling shareholder's share pledging is more pronounced for listed firms with less efficient information environment and weaker corporate governance. Further analysis indicates that the negative relation is also more pronounced when controlling shareholders are under higher margin call pressure and when the visiting institutional investors consist of more fund companies. Overall, our study is the first to provide direct evidence of the governance mechanism of financial intermediaries on shareholders' pledging decisions.

语种:

英文

出版日期:

2023-10

学科:

工商管理

收录:

SSCI

提交日期

2023-10-10

引用参考

Xiao, Zhongyi; Chen, Haitao; Chen, Kang. How does institutional investors' information acquisition inhibit share pledging? Evidence from China[J]. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS,2023():.

  • dc.title
  • How does institutional investors' information acquisition inhibit share pledging? Evidence from China
  • dc.contributor.author
  • Xiao, Zhongyi; Chen, Haitao; Chen, Kang
  • dc.contributor.affiliation
  • Southwest Univ Polit Sci & Law, Business Sch, 301 Baosheng Ave, Chongqing, Peoples R China;Southwest Univ Polit Sci & Law, Res Ctr Audit & Rule Law, 301 Baosheng Ave, Chongqing, Peoples R China;Southwest Univ Polit Sci & Law, Sch Econ, 301 Baosheng Ave, Chongqing, Peoples R China;Southwestern Univ Finance & Econ, Inst Chinese Financial Studies, 555 Liutai Ave, Chengdu, Sichuan, Peoples R China
  • dc.contributor.corresponding
  • Chen, K
  • dc.contributor.correspondingAffiliation
  • Chen, K (通讯作者),Southwestern Univ Finance & Econ, Inst Chinese Financial Studies, 555 Liutai Ave, Chengdu, Sichuan, Peoples R China.
  • dc.publisher
  • INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
  • dc.identifier.year
  • 2023
  • dc.identifier.volume
  • 89
  • dc.date.issued
  • 2023-10
  • dc.language.iso
  • 英文
  • dc.subject
  • CORPORATE SITE VISITS; POLITICAL CONNECTIONS; OWNERSHIP; STOCK; FIRMS
  • dc.description.abstract
  • This study investigates whether and how institutional investors' information acquisition affects controlling shareholder's share pledging. Taking a unique data of institutional investors' corporate site visits in China, we find that institutional investors' corporate site visits significantly inhibit controlling shareholder's share pledging. This effect is robust to a series of robustness checks, including controlling for endogeneity concerns, propensity score matching method, alternative model specifications, and alternative measures of the independent variable. We then provide evidence that the negative relation between institutional investors' corporate site visits and controlling shareholder's share pledging is more pronounced for listed firms with less efficient information environment and weaker corporate governance. Further analysis indicates that the negative relation is also more pronounced when controlling shareholders are under higher margin call pressure and when the visiting institutional investors consist of more fund companies. Overall, our study is the first to provide direct evidence of the governance mechanism of financial intermediaries on shareholders' pledging decisions.
  • dc.identifier.issn
  • 1057-5219
回到顶部