反垄断监管领域约谈制度研究——基于回应性规制理论的分析

Research on the Interview System in the Field of Antitrust Regulation: Analysis Based on Responsive Regulation Theory

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归属学者:

叶明

归属院系:

经济法学院

作者:

叶明1 ;李文博

摘要:

目前,在反垄断监管领域,约谈已经成为监管机构不可或缺的规制工具,虽然具有现代化市场监管工具的面向,但更多的是本土逻辑下的现实演绎。这就导致反垄断约谈制度面临实效难题,具体表现为约谈之启动存在泛化风险、约谈之实施缺乏程序控制、约谈之回访忽视梯次衔接。更为重要的是,透过实效难题,理论困境一览无余,法教义学和公共利益理论都无法对反垄断约谈制度进行有效回应,“理性-工具”范式陷入窘境。回应性规制理论以其具有的“商谈-建构”色彩,对反垄断约谈制度进行了有效回应,二者具有谱系亲和性。为解决反垄断约谈制度的实效困境,需要在回应性规制的理论视阈下进行制度构建,坚持支持优先的约谈理念、实现约谈主体的多元化、合理界定约谈范围、加强对约谈实施全链条的程序控制,并在约谈回访过程中阶梯式配置监管工具,从而为反垄断监管提供重要的制度创新补给,推进反垄断监管治理。

语种:

中文

出版日期:

2023-05-26

学科:

法学

提交日期

2023-08-02

引用参考

叶明;李文博. 反垄断监管领域约谈制度研究——基于回应性规制理论的分析[J]. 竞争政策研究,2023(03):17-31.

全文附件授权许可

知识共享许可协议-署名

  • dc.title
  • 反垄断监管领域约谈制度研究——基于回应性规制理论的分析
  • dc.contributor.author
  • 叶明;李文博
  • dc.contributor.author
  • Ye Ming;Li Wenbo
  • dc.contributor.affiliation
  • 西南政法大学经济法学院
  • dc.publisher
  • 竞争政策研究
  • dc.publisher
  • Competition Policy Research
  • dc.identifier.year
  • 2023
  • dc.identifier.issue
  • 03
  • dc.identifier.volume
  • No.48
  • dc.identifier.page
  • 17-31
  • dc.date.issued
  • 2023-05-26
  • dc.language.iso
  • 中文
  • dc.subject
  • 反垄断监管;约谈;回应性规制
  • dc.subject
  • Antitrust Regulation;Interview;Responsive Regulation
  • dc.description.abstract
  • 目前,在反垄断监管领域,约谈已经成为监管机构不可或缺的规制工具,虽然具有现代化市场监管工具的面向,但更多的是本土逻辑下的现实演绎。这就导致反垄断约谈制度面临实效难题,具体表现为约谈之启动存在泛化风险、约谈之实施缺乏程序控制、约谈之回访忽视梯次衔接。更为重要的是,透过实效难题,理论困境一览无余,法教义学和公共利益理论都无法对反垄断约谈制度进行有效回应,“理性-工具”范式陷入窘境。回应性规制理论以其具有的“商谈-建构”色彩,对反垄断约谈制度进行了有效回应,二者具有谱系亲和性。为解决反垄断约谈制度的实效困境,需要在回应性规制的理论视阈下进行制度构建,坚持支持优先的约谈理念、实现约谈主体的多元化、合理界定约谈范围、加强对约谈实施全链条的程序控制,并在约谈回访过程中阶梯式配置监管工具,从而为反垄断监管提供重要的制度创新补给,推进反垄断监管治理。
  • dc.description.abstract
  • At present, in the field of antitrust regulation, the interview has become an indispensable regulatory tool for regulators, and although it has the orientation of enriching modern market regulation tools, it is more a realistic interpretation under the local logic. This has led to the problem of the effectiveness of the antitrust negotiation system,which is manifested in the risk of generalization of the initiation of negotiation, the lack of procedural control of the implementation of negotiation, and the neglect of the step-by-step connection of the return visit of negotiation. More importantly, the theoretical dilemma is evident through the effectiveness problem, as both legal doctrine and public interest theory are unable to respond effectively to the antitrust negotiation system, and the rational-instrumental paradigm is in a dilemma. The theory of responsive regulation, with its deliberative-constructive overtones, provides an effective response to the antitrust bargaining system, and the two have a genealogical affinity. In order to solve the effective dilemma of the antitrust negotiation system, it is necessary to carry out the system construction under the theoretical threshold of responsive regulation, adhere to the concept of negotiation with priority of support, realize the diversification of negotiation subjects, reasonably define the scope of negotiation, strengthen the procedural control of the whole chain of negotiation implementation, and configure the regulatory tools in the process of negotiation return in a stepwise manner, so as to provide an important institutional innovation supply for antitrust regulation and promote antitrust This will provide an important institutional innovation supplement for antitrust regulation and promote antitrust regulatory governance.
  • dc.description.sponsorshipPCode
  • 18ZDA150;20BFX147
  • dc.description.sponsorship
  • 国家社会科学基金重大项目“互联网经济的法治保障研究”(18ZDA150);国家社会科学基金一般项目“互联网领域反不正当竞争执法疑难问题研究”(20BFX147)的研究成果
  • dc.description.sponsorshipsource
  • 国家社会科学基金
  • dc.identifier.CN
  • 10-1303/F
  • dc.identifier.issn
  • 2096-0980
  • dc.identifier.if
  • 1.578
  • dc.subject.discipline
  • D922.294
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