后民法典时代生育权的人格权地位证成

Demonstration of reproductive rights as personality rights in the post Civil Code era

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归属学者：

张建文

归属院系：

民商法学院

作者：

李倩 ; 张建文2

摘要：

尽管我国《民法典》第110条未明文列举生育权，但其条文内容的开放性为生育权的人格权地位证成提供了制度空间。生育权的正当性源于其自由价值，当下我国生育观念在保留传统家文化的同时，也基本完成对生育自由价值的吸纳。随着生育政策进一步放宽，公法对生育权的合理规制不构成对私法上生育权成立的阻碍。尽管生育行为须男女两性配合完成，但关于是否生育的选择本质上由个人作出，故生育权归属于作为个体的自然人，而非作为整体的夫妻。其中，即使男性在生理上无法孕育子女，但因其妻是否妊娠直接关乎丈夫的家庭规划，所以丈夫也有参与决定是否生育子女的权利，这在人类辅助生殖领域体现得尤为明显，故男性也属于生育权的主体。生育权与身体权、健康权存在本质差异。虽然对生育权的行使往往落脚于对自己身体的支配，但正如婚姻自主权、缔约自由权早已从“行动自由”这一兜底性权利中分化出去一样，生育权也因具有极其独特的内涵与外延，而应与身体权区分开来。生育权与健康权的区别较为明显，前者是自由性人格权益，而后者是物质性人格权，且两者价值追求也截然不同。生育权具有典型公开性，社会认知对于生育自由的重要性早已达成普遍共识；从对现有裁判文书的梳理来看，生育权概念在在我国司法实践中已被广泛运用，相关的救济经验积累正逐步完备。生育权符合从利益到权利的一般证成标准，将其视为人格权并非权利泛化现象，生育权应属《民法典》第110条“等权利”之表述中所包含而未列明的具体人格权。

语种：

中文

出版日期：

2021-09-29

学科：

法学

收录：

北大核心期刊; CSSCI; 中国科技核心期刊

提交日期：

2023-08-02

引用参考：

李倩;张建文. 后民法典时代生育权的人格权地位证成[J]. 重庆大学学报(社会科学版),2023(03):212-223.

全文附件授权许可：

知识共享许可协议-署名

  • dc.title
  • 后民法典时代生育权的人格权地位证成
  • dc.contributor.author
  • 李倩;张建文
  • dc.contributor.author
  • LI Qian;ZHANG Jianwen;Law School, Kunming University of Science and Technology;Civil and Commercial Law School, Southwest University of Political Science and Law
  • dc.contributor.affiliation
  • 昆明理工大学法学院;西南政法大学民商法学院
  • dc.publisher
  • 重庆大学学报(社会科学版)
  • dc.publisher
  • Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)
  • dc.identifier.year
  • 2023
  • dc.identifier.issue
  • 03
  • dc.identifier.volume
  • v.29;No.162
  • dc.identifier.page
  • 212-223
  • dc.date.issued
  • 2021-09-29
  • dc.language.iso
  • 中文
  • dc.subject
  • 生育权;人格权;身体权;权利泛化
  • dc.subject
  • reproductive rights;personality rights;body rights;generalization of rights
  • dc.description.abstract
  • 尽管我国《民法典》第110条未明文列举生育权，但其条文内容的开放性为生育权的人格权地位证成提供了制度空间。生育权的正当性源于其自由价值，当下我国生育观念在保留传统家文化的同时，也基本完成对生育自由价值的吸纳。随着生育政策进一步放宽，公法对生育权的合理规制不构成对私法上生育权成立的阻碍。尽管生育行为须男女两性配合完成，但关于是否生育的选择本质上由个人作出，故生育权归属于作为个体的自然人，而非作为整体的夫妻。其中，即使男性在生理上无法孕育子女，但因其妻是否妊娠直接关乎丈夫的家庭规划，所以丈夫也有参与决定是否生育子女的权利，这在人类辅助生殖领域体现得尤为明显，故男性也属于生育权的主体。生育权与身体权、健康权存在本质差异。虽然对生育权的行使往往落脚于对自己身体的支配，但正如婚姻自主权、缔约自由权早已从“行动自由”这一兜底性权利中分化出去一样，生育权也因具有极其独特的内涵与外延，而应与身体权区分开来。生育权与健康权的区别较为明显，前者是自由性人格权益，而后者是物质性人格权，且两者价值追求也截然不同。生育权具有典型公开性，社会认知对于生育自由的重要性早已达成普遍共识；从对现有裁判文书的梳理来看，生育权概念在在我国司法实践中已被广泛运用，相关的救济经验积累正逐步完备。生育权符合从利益到权利的一般证成标准，将其视为人格权并非权利泛化现象，生育权应属《民法典》第110条“等权利”之表述中所包含而未列明的具体人格权。
  • dc.description.abstract
  • Although Article 110 of the Civil Code does not expressly establish the reproductive rights, its openness provides an institutional space for the status of personality rights of reproduction rights. The legitimacy of reproductive rights stems from freedom value. At present, the concept of fertility in China has basically completed the absorption of the value of reproduction freedom while preserving the traditional family culture. The reasonable regulation of reproductive rights by public law does not deny the establishment of it in private law. Although the reproductive behavior needs the cooperation of men and women, the choice of whether to have children is essentially made by individuals, so the reproductive right belongs to natural persons as individuals, not to couples as a whole. Meanwhile, even if men are physically unable to have children, whether the wives are pregnant is directly related to the husbands' family planning, husbands also have the right to participate in deciding whether to have children, which is particularly obvious in the field of human assisted reproduction, so men also belong to the subject of reproductive rights. There are essential differences between reproductive rights, body rights and health rights. Although the exercise of reproductive rights often rests on the control of one's own body, just as the right of marriage autonomy and freedom of contracting has long been differentiated from the basic right of “freedom of action”, reproductive rights should be distinguished from body rights because of their extremely unique connotation and extension. The difference between reproductive rights and health rights is obvious. The former is a free personality right, while the latter is a material personality right, and their value pursuit is completely different. Reproductive rights are typical, and the public has already reached a general consensus on the importance of reproductive freedom. Judging from the existing judgment documents, the concept of reproductive rights has also been widely used in judicial practice, and the protection system for reproductive rights has gradually improved. Reproduction rights conform to the general justification standard from interest to rights. Treating reproduction rights as personality rights is not the generalization of rights. Reproduction rights belong to the type of personality rights that not listed in Article 110 of the Civil Code.
  • dc.description.sponsorshipPCode
  • 2021QN202118;JS-ZTGJAQG-009;20212021J0078
  • dc.description.sponsorship
  • 2021年度云南省哲学社会科学规划青年项目“民法典视域下人类辅助生殖的私法秩序建构”(QN202118);2020年西南政法大学总体国家安全观研究院重点项目“生物安全风险防控和治理体系建设专项课题”(JS-ZTGJAQG-009);2021年度云南省教育厅科学研究基金(人文社科类)项目“民法典时代云南省家庭教育地方立法研究”(2021J0078)
  • dc.identifier.CN
  • 50-1023/C
  • dc.identifier.issn
  • 1008-5831
  • dc.identifier.if
  • 2.913
  • dc.subject.discipline
  • D923
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