“秘密自治”的数字平台信用评分:隐忧与规制

The "Secret Autonomy" of Digital Platform Credit Scoring: Concerns and Regulation

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归属学者：

叶明

归属院系：

经济法学院（生态法学院）

作者：

叶明1 ;邱威棋

摘要：

数字平台信用评分构建了与传统市场信任机制完全不同的全新信任机制，由数字平台创设并实施，经由平台用户参与和使用而不断拓展。描述数字平台信用评分处于平台“秘密自治”中：其表象为生成、使用与救济各环节皆处于“秘密自治”,其本质为私利性与公共性的利益冲突和自治秩序与法定秩序的秩序冲撞。揭示数字平台信用评分“秘密自治”的隐忧：评分标准不公开易导致信用焦虑、评分活动不受监督易诱发信用操控、评分结果无法验证可引发网络信任机制失灵。指出数字平台信用评分面临着平台自治失效、私权规制低效、公权监管缺位的规制困境。提出可通过在规制路径、规制模式、规制工具以及责任形式等四个方面进行创新，以构建秩序为规制路径，采用参与者协同共治规制模式，运用信息工具，适配资格减免责任作为规制方案，以期消除“秘密自治”乱象，健全评分制度，规范评分活动，保障数字平台信用评分机制正常发挥作用。

语种：

中文

出版日期：

2023-05-11

学科：

法学; 应用经济学; 公共管理

收录：

北大核心期刊; CSSCI; 中国科技核心期刊

提交日期：

2023-07-19

引用参考：

叶明;邱威棋. “秘密自治”的数字平台信用评分:隐忧与规制[J]. 北京工业大学学报(社会科学版),2023(04):118-134.

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知识共享许可协议-署名

  • dc.title
  • “秘密自治”的数字平台信用评分:隐忧与规制
  • dc.contributor.author
  • 叶明;邱威棋
  • dc.contributor.author
  • YE Ming;QIU Weiqi;Economical Law School, Southwest University of Political Science and Law
  • dc.contributor.affiliation
  • 西南政法大学经济法学院
  • dc.publisher
  • 北京工业大学学报(社会科学版)
  • dc.publisher
  • Journal of Beijing University of Technology(Social Sciences Edition)
  • dc.identifier.year
  • 2023
  • dc.identifier.issue
  • 04
  • dc.identifier.volume
  • v.23;No.124
  • dc.identifier.page
  • 118-134
  • dc.date.issued
  • 2023-05-11
  • dc.language.iso
  • 中文
  • dc.subject
  • 信用评分;数字信用;信用评价;秘密自治;个人信用
  • dc.subject
  • credit scoring;digital credit;credit evaluation;secret autonomy;personal credit
  • dc.description.abstract
  • 数字平台信用评分构建了与传统市场信任机制完全不同的全新信任机制，由数字平台创设并实施，经由平台用户参与和使用而不断拓展。描述数字平台信用评分处于平台“秘密自治”中：其表象为生成、使用与救济各环节皆处于“秘密自治”,其本质为私利性与公共性的利益冲突和自治秩序与法定秩序的秩序冲撞。揭示数字平台信用评分“秘密自治”的隐忧：评分标准不公开易导致信用焦虑、评分活动不受监督易诱发信用操控、评分结果无法验证可引发网络信任机制失灵。指出数字平台信用评分面临着平台自治失效、私权规制低效、公权监管缺位的规制困境。提出可通过在规制路径、规制模式、规制工具以及责任形式等四个方面进行创新，以构建秩序为规制路径，采用参与者协同共治规制模式，运用信息工具，适配资格减免责任作为规制方案，以期消除“秘密自治”乱象，健全评分制度，规范评分活动，保障数字平台信用评分机制正常发挥作用。
  • dc.description.abstract
  • Compared with traditional trust mechanism, the credit scoring mechanism for the digital platform is a new one that is created and implemented by the platform and develops by the participation and use of the platform users. For such mechanism, this study indicates that it is "secretly autonomous" in the platform in its generation, use and relief measures, and is essentially the conflict between self-interest and public interest and that between autonomous and legal orders. Then, this study puts forward that such "secret autonomy" may bring potential problems: the credit anxiety out of non-disclosure of scoring standards, the credit manipulation due to unsupervised scoring activities, and the failed network trust mechanism owing to unable to verify the scoring results. When making regulations on credit scoring mechanism, we may trap in the dilemma of lacking efficient platform autonomy, regulation of private rights, and supervision by public power. As a result, this study proposes that we can make progress in the regulation path, mode and tool, and form of responsibilities. To make it further, we can take the construction of order as the regulation path and the participant collaborative governance as the regulation mode, by adopting the information tools and the responsibility mode of limiting qualification of market subjects, to eliminate the potential problems of "secret autonomy", improve the scoring regulations and activities and ensure the credit scoring mechanism for the digital platform works efficiently.
  • dc.description.sponsorshipPCode
  • 18ZDA150;2021XZXSZC-004
  • dc.description.sponsorship
  • 国家社会科学基金重大项目(18ZDA150);西南政法大学学生科研创新项目(2021XZXSZC-004)
  • dc.description.sponsorshipsource
  • 国家社会科学基金
  • dc.identifier.CN
  • 11-4558/G
  • dc.identifier.issn
  • 1671-0398
  • dc.identifier.if
  • 2.762
  • dc.subject.discipline
  • D922.28;D923;F49
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