董事离职补偿的公司法逻辑

Directors' Resignation Compensation in the Logic of Company Law

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归属学者：

曹兴权

归属院系：

民商法学院（知识产权学院）

作者：

曹兴权1 ;王婷婷

摘要：

鉴于董事与公司之间的委任关系以及董事是公司主要管理者的特殊身份,董事离职补偿纠纷的裁判思维应从劳动法转向合同法,并回归董事自我交易本质的公司法逻辑,嵌入公平原则与公序良俗原则作为判断是否获得补偿以及如何补偿的基本准则,构建对董事离职补偿进行限制的程序机制与实质审查标准。程序机制,包括公司内部离职补偿决策权配置以及离职董事参与机制。前者主要指股东(大)会享有最终决策权、一般排除董事会决策权、辅之以监事会的监督;后者主要指离职董事的知情权、陈述权及议价权。是否补偿乃至补偿额度的实质审查,主要考虑董事离职原因、董事剩余任期以及董事薪酬水平三个要素,应引入违反忠实义务被解除职务的离职补偿约定无效、以职工平均工资为合理水平的董事薪酬限额规则。

出版日期：

2021-12-15

学科：

法学

提交日期：

2022-01-20

引用参考：

曹兴权;王婷婷. 董事离职补偿的公司法逻辑[J]. 西南政法大学学报,2021(06):88-105.

全文附件授权许可：

知识共享许可协议-署名

  • dc.title
  • 董事离职补偿的公司法逻辑
  • dc.contributor.author
  • 曹兴权;王婷婷
  • dc.contributor.author
  • CAO Xing-quan;WANG Ting-ting;Southwest University of Political Science and Law
  • dc.contributor.affiliation
  • 西南政法大学民商法学院
  • dc.publisher
  • 西南政法大学学报
  • dc.publisher
  • Journal of Southwest University of Political Science and Law
  • dc.identifier.year
  • 2021
  • dc.identifier.issue
  • 06
  • dc.identifier.volume
  • v.23;No.138
  • dc.identifier.page
  • 88-105
  • dc.date.issued
  • 2021-12-15
  • dc.subject
  • 董事离职补偿;公平原则;公序良俗原则;程序限制;实体限制
  • dc.subject
  • compensation for director's resignation;principle of fairness;principle of public order and good customs;procedural restriction;substantial restriction
  • dc.description.abstract
  • 鉴于董事与公司之间的委任关系以及董事是公司主要管理者的特殊身份,董事离职补偿纠纷的裁判思维应从劳动法转向合同法,并回归董事自我交易本质的公司法逻辑,嵌入公平原则与公序良俗原则作为判断是否获得补偿以及如何补偿的基本准则,构建对董事离职补偿进行限制的程序机制与实质审查标准。程序机制,包括公司内部离职补偿决策权配置以及离职董事参与机制。前者主要指股东(大)会享有最终决策权、一般排除董事会决策权、辅之以监事会的监督;后者主要指离职董事的知情权、陈述权及议价权。是否补偿乃至补偿额度的实质审查,主要考虑董事离职原因、董事剩余任期以及董事薪酬水平三个要素,应引入违反忠实义务被解除职务的离职补偿约定无效、以职工平均工资为合理水平的董事薪酬限额规则。
  • dc.description.abstract
  • In view of the appointment relationship between the director and the company and the special status of the director as the main manager of the company,the adjudication of director 's resignation compensation disputes should shift from labor law to contract law,and return to the logic of company law which is the essence of director's self-dealing,embedding the principles of fairness and public order and morality as the basic criteria for judging whether and how to receive compensation,and constructing a procedural mechanism and substantive review standards for limiting the severance compensation of directors.The procedural mechanism includes the logical allocation of the company's internal decision-making power which is based on the final decision-making power of the shareholders' meeting,the exclusion of the decision-making power of the board of directors and the auxiliary supervision of the board of supervisors,as well as the participation mechanism of resigned directors including the directors' rights to know,to statement and to bargain. The substantive review mainly considers three elements: the reason for the resignation,the remaining term of directors and the salary level of directors. We should introduce the rules that the resignation compensation agreement for who is dismissed in violation of the duty of loyalty is invalid and take the average salary of employees as the benchmark for calculating directors' resignation compensation.
  • dc.description.sponsorshipPCode
  • 20ZDA044
  • dc.description.sponsorship
  • 研究阐释党的十九届四中全会精神国家社科基金重大项目“营商环境法治化的制度架构与实现研究”(20ZDA044)
  • dc.description.sponsorshipsource
  • 国家社会科学基金
  • dc.identifier.CN
  • 50-1024/C
  • dc.identifier.issn
  • 1008-4355
  • dc.identifier.if
  • 0.865
  • dc.subject.discipline
  • D922.291.91
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