信访属地管理偏误下基层政府的困惑与解惑——自利与避责的分析框架

Perplexity and Solution of the Basic-level Government with the Bias and Mistakes of the Territorial Management in Petition System——An Analytical Framework of Self-interest and Avoidance

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归属学者：

邹东升

归属院系：

政治与公共管理学院

作者：

邹东升1,2

摘要：

属地管理作为当前我国信访工作的一项法定原则,旨在将信访矛盾处理于源头,化解于基层。基于任务与权能失配、事权与财权分离、责任属地而权力不属地,趋利和避害对人的心理驱动以及行为驱使生成隐性推力,渐次异化为自利与避责后,造成信访属地管理发生偏误。为此,基层政府时常遭遇逆向激励和目标置换的倒逼,"事属地"滥用为"人属地"的执行偏误,条块关系下的权责抵牾等困惑。谋求简约有效的制度修正,有必要理性检视信访属地管理的机制设计。通过对属地管理认知的正本清源,驱动信访由"人情之治"迈向"规则之治"。

出版日期：

2020-12-21

学科：

中外政治制度

收录：

北大核心期刊; CSSCI; 中国科技核心期刊

提交日期：

2021-01-14

引用参考：

邹东升. 信访属地管理偏误下基层政府的困惑与解惑——自利与避责的分析框架[J]. 行政论坛,2020(06):42-50.

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  • dc.title
  • 信访属地管理偏误下基层政府的困惑与解惑——自利与避责的分析框架
  • dc.contributor.author
  • 邹东升
  • dc.contributor.author
  • ZOU Dongsheng;Social Stability and Crisis Management Research Center China, Southwest University of Political Science and Law;China Research Center for Petition and Rule of Law, Southwest University of Political Science and Law
  • dc.contributor.affiliation
  • 西南政法大学中国社会稳定与危机管理研究中心;西南政法大学中国信访与法治中国研究中心
  • dc.publisher
  • 行政论坛
  • dc.publisher
  • Administrative Tribune
  • dc.identifier.year
  • 2020
  • dc.identifier.issue
  • 06
  • dc.identifier.volume
  • v.27;No.162
  • dc.identifier.page
  • 42-50
  • dc.date.issued
  • 2020-12-21
  • dc.subject
  • 属地管理;信访;基层政府;自利;避责;偏误
  • dc.subject
  • territorial management;petition system;basic-level government;self-interest;avoidance;bias and mistakes
  • dc.description.abstract
  • 属地管理作为当前我国信访工作的一项法定原则,旨在将信访矛盾处理于源头,化解于基层。基于任务与权能失配、事权与财权分离、责任属地而权力不属地,趋利和避害对人的心理驱动以及行为驱使生成隐性推力,渐次异化为自利与避责后,造成信访属地管理发生偏误。为此,基层政府时常遭遇逆向激励和目标置换的倒逼,"事属地"滥用为"人属地"的执行偏误,条块关系下的权责抵牾等困惑。谋求简约有效的制度修正,有必要理性检视信访属地管理的机制设计。通过对属地管理认知的正本清源,驱动信访由"人情之治"迈向"规则之治"。
  • dc.description.abstract
  • As a legal principle in China's current petition work, territorial management aims to deal with the conflict of petition at the source and dissolve it at the grassroots level. Based on the misallocation of tasks and powers, separation of administrative powers from financial powers, and territorial responsibility but not territorial powers, the pursuit of profit and avoidance of harm have a hidden thrust on people's psychology and behavior,which gradually alienated into self-interest and avoidance, resulting in bias and mistakes of the territorial management in petition system. For this reason, the basic-level government is often confronted with adverse incentives and target replacement, the misuse of"things based on territoriality"as"human based on territoriality"implementation errors, and the contradiction of rights and responsibilities under the relations between and departments and regions. In order to seek simple and effective system modification, it is necessary to rationally examine the design of the mechanism of territorial management in petition system. By correcting the cognition of territorial management, it drives the petition from"rule of human relations"to"rule of rules".
  • dc.description.sponsorshipPCode
  • 2020AG0804;19JD004;CGYJ2020001
  • dc.description.sponsorship
  • 国家信访局信访理论研究项目“情、理、法在信访工作中的运用实证研究”(2020AG0804);重庆市教育委员会人文社会科学重点基地项目“大数据背景下的重大公共决策非理性舆论传播与风险治理研究”(19JD004);重庆市城市管理局课题“城市治理现代化背景下的城市公共空间治理研究”(CGYJ2020001)
  • dc.identifier.CN
  • 23-1360/D
  • dc.identifier.issn
  • 1005-460X
  • dc.identifier.if
  • 1.529
  • dc.subject.discipline
  • D632.8
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