Game Analysis of Hydropower Bidding under Incomplete Information

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归属学者：

李姣姣

归属院系：

商学院（监察审计学院）

作者：

Li, Jiaojiao1 ; Zhao, Linfeng

摘要：

In this paper, the law of price formation in hydropower market is explored from the perspective of incomplete information, in order to realize the research objectives of determining the reasonable electricity price by designing a fair online competition mechanism of electrical energy to effectively restrain the market power of power plants. The game analysis on spot market shows the volatility and uncertainty of on-grid price under the change of market demand. The analysis of actual cases proves that the selection of different auction mechanisms by power grid will affect the selection of competition strategies by power plants, thus further affecting the balanced development of on-grid price.

语种：

英文

出版日期：

2020

学科：

环境科学与工程; 地理学; 地球物理学

提交日期：

2020-12-31

引用参考：

Li, Jiaojiao; Zhao, Linfeng. Game Analysis of Hydropower Bidding under Incomplete Information[J]. JOURNAL OF COASTAL RESEARCH,2020():398-401.

  • dc.title
  • Game Analysis of Hydropower Bidding under Incomplete Information
  • dc.contributor.author
  • Li, Jiaojiao; Zhao, Linfeng
  • dc.contributor.affiliation
  • Southwest Univ Polit Sci & Law, Sch Business, Chongqing 401120, Peoples R China;Boston Univ, Dept Phys, 590 Commonwealth Ave, Boston, MA 02215 USA
  • dc.contributor.corresponding
  • Li, JJ (corresponding author), Southwest Univ Polit Sci & Law, Sch Business, Chongqing 401120, Peoples R China.
  • dc.publisher
  • JOURNAL OF COASTAL RESEARCH
  • dc.identifier.year
  • 2020
  • dc.identifier.page
  • 398-401
  • dc.date.issued
  • 2020
  • dc.language.iso
  • 英文
  • dc.description.abstract
  • In this paper, the law of price formation in hydropower market is explored from the perspective of incomplete information, in order to realize the research objectives of determining the reasonable electricity price by designing a fair online competition mechanism of electrical energy to effectively restrain the market power of power plants. The game analysis on spot market shows the volatility and uncertainty of on-grid price under the change of market demand. The analysis of actual cases proves that the selection of different auction mechanisms by power grid will affect the selection of competition strategies by power plants, thus further affecting the balanced development of on-grid price.
  • dc.identifier.issn
  • 0749-0208
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