AI刑事责任主体否定论的法理与哲理证成——兼论“人”是什么

The Jurisprudence and Philosophical Proof of the Negative Theory of AI Criminal Responsibility Subject——Also on What “Human” Is

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归属学者:

李永升

归属院系:

法学院

作者:

冯文杰 ; 李永升

摘要:

AI刑事责任主体肯定论隐藏着将问题缥缈化、对策简单化及法理忽视化的问题之虞。当前的AI刑事责任主体否定论存在忽视肯定论的具体语境问题而稍显批判力不足之虞,应对其进行法理与哲理证成。弱AI产品与强AI产品都不应是刑事责任主体,而是人类可控制的依靠电能存续的AI机械产品,应被作为人类实现自由而全面发展的工具。人是万物的尺度,肯定论不当坚持了一种机械式"人"论。刑事法适用的核心部分和刑事归责的基本原理不会因AI技术的出现发生根本变化。对AI技术发展的风险,不仅需依靠算法的顶层设计,且需将法治管理嵌入AI发展的每个环节,以防止造成消极后果。法律人须承认自身知识的局限性、保持适度克制、不能误将情感或联想等同于"现实"。

出版日期:

2020-01-20

学科:

刑法学

收录:

CSSCI; 中国科技核心期刊

提交日期

2020-04-16

引用参考

冯文杰;李永升. AI刑事责任主体否定论的法理与哲理证成——兼论“人”是什么[J]. 东北大学学报(社会科学版),2020(01):90-98.

  • dc.title
  • AI刑事责任主体否定论的法理与哲理证成——兼论“人”是什么
  • dc.contributor.author
  • 冯文杰;李永升
  • dc.contributor.author
  • FENG Wen-jie;LI Yong-sheng;School of Law, Southeast University;School of Law, Southwest University of Political Science and Law
  • dc.contributor.affiliation
  • 东南大学法学院;西南政法大学法学院
  • dc.publisher
  • 东北大学学报(社会科学版)
  • dc.publisher
  • Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science)
  • dc.identifier.year
  • 2020
  • dc.identifier.issue
  • 01
  • dc.identifier.volume
  • v.22;No.119
  • dc.identifier.page
  • 90-98
  • dc.date.issued
  • 2020-01-20
  • dc.subject
  • AI刑事责任主体肯定论;AI刑事责任主体否定论;法理证成;哲理证成
  • dc.subject
  • the affirmation of AI criminal responsibility subject;the negative theory of AI criminal responsibility subject;jurisprudence proof;philosophical proof
  • dc.description.abstract
  • AI刑事责任主体肯定论隐藏着将问题缥缈化、对策简单化及法理忽视化的问题之虞。当前的AI刑事责任主体否定论存在忽视肯定论的具体语境问题而稍显批判力不足之虞,应对其进行法理与哲理证成。弱AI产品与强AI产品都不应是刑事责任主体,而是人类可控制的依靠电能存续的AI机械产品,应被作为人类实现自由而全面发展的工具。人是万物的尺度,肯定论不当坚持了一种机械式"人"论。刑事法适用的核心部分和刑事归责的基本原理不会因AI技术的出现发生根本变化。对AI技术发展的风险,不仅需依靠算法的顶层设计,且需将法治管理嵌入AI发展的每个环节,以防止造成消极后果。法律人须承认自身知识的局限性、保持适度克制、不能误将情感或联想等同于"现实"。
  • dc.description.abstract
  • The affirmation of AI criminal responsibility subject hides the problems of floating the problem, simplifying the strategy, and neglecting the legal principle. The current negative theory of AI criminal responsibility subject has the problem of neglecting the specific context of affirmation and the lack of critical power.It should be legalized and philosophically proved. Neither the weak AI products nor the strong AI products should be the subject of criminal responsibility. They are only intelligent mechanical products that humans can control and that rely on electric energy for survival. They should be used as tools for human beings to achieve free and comprehensive development. Man is the measure of all things.The affirmation theory insists on a mechanical "human". The core part of the application of criminal law and the basic principles of criminal imputation will not change fundamentally due to the emergence of AI technology. The risk of the development of AI technology depends not only on the top-level design of the algorithm, but also on the integration of rule of law management into every aspect of AI development to prevent negative consequences. Legal persons must acknowledge the limitations of their knowledge, maintain moderate restraint, and must not mistake emotion or association for "reality".
  • dc.description.sponsorshipPCode
  • 16ZDA060;15YJA820015;18SKGH007
  • dc.description.sponsorship
  • 国家社会科学基金重大资助项目(16ZDA060);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(15YJA820015);重庆市教委人文社会科学一般资助项目(18SKGH007)
  • dc.description.sponsorshipsource
  • 国家社会科学基金
  • dc.identifier.CN
  • 21-1413/G4
  • dc.identifier.issn
  • 1008-3758
  • dc.identifier.if
  • 0.740
  • dc.subject.discipline
  • D914
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