Analysis of advertising and a points-exchange incentive in a reverse supply chain for unwanted medications in households based on Game Theory

基于博弈论的家庭废弃药品回收中的宣传与积分兑换激励的分析

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归属学者:

花美娜

作者:

Hua, Meina ; Lai, Ivan Ka Wai ; Tang, Huajun

摘要:

Recently, environmental issues have raised an increasing amount of attention, which has led to a quick development of green supply chains. Particularly, the collection and disposal of unwanted medications (UMs) in households have been an increasingly important research topic. However, there is little work on building an effective reverse logistics (RL) system for collecting UMs. For stimulating more collections of UMs, an RL system with a points-exchange incentive scheme and advertising is proposed in this study. Based on Game Theory, this research takes the lead in investigating the effects of these two strategies in a two-echelon supply chain composed of a pharmaceutical manufacturer and a retailer. For the game theoretic analysis, four games are established: non-cooperative, retailer as the Stackelberg leader, manufacturer as the Stackelberg leader, and centralized games. There are three situations in each game, namely, the advertising-effective region, exchange-effective region, and joint-effective region. The optimal strategies of advertising and points-exchange proportion for both members are identified. In both joint-effective and exchange-effective regions, a preferable decentralized supply chain structure is the Nash policy, whereas it does not matter who leads the game in the advertising-effective region. Cooperation is crucial in the model, which results in a larger collection and more profit of the total supply chain. Finally, this study provides managerial implications and some suggestions for future research.

语种:

英文

出版日期:

2019-11

学科:

管理科学与工程; 工学

收录:

SCI(E)

提交日期

2019-12-25

引用参考

Hua, Meina; Lai, Ivan Ka Wai; Tang, Huajun. Analysis of advertising and a points-exchange incentive in a reverse supply chain for unwanted medications in households based on Game Theory[J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION ECONOMICS,2019(02):259-268.

  • dc.title
  • Analysis of advertising and a points-exchange incentive in a reverse supply chain for unwanted medications in households based on Game Theory
  • dc.title.alternative
  • 基于博弈论的家庭废弃药品回收中的宣传与积分兑换激励的分析
  • dc.contributor.author
  • Hua, Meina; Lai, Ivan Ka Wai; Tang, Huajun
  • dc.contributor.affiliation
  • Southwest Univ Polit Sci & Law, Sch Polit & Publ Adm, Chongqing, Peoples R China;City Univ Macau, Fac Int Tourism & Management, Macau, Peoples R China;Macau Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Dept Decis Sci, 0921 Ave Wai Long, Taipa, Macao, Peoples R China
  • dc.contributor.corresponding
  • Tang, HJ (reprint author), Macau Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Dept Decis Sci, 0921 Ave Wai Long, Taipa, Macao, Peoples R China.
  • dc.publisher
  • INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION ECONOMICS
  • dc.identifier.year
  • 2019
  • dc.identifier.issue
  • 02
  • dc.identifier.volume
  • 217
  • dc.identifier.page
  • 259-268
  • dc.date.issued
  • 2019-11
  • dc.language.iso
  • 英文
  • dc.subject
  • Advertising; Points-exchange incentive; Unwanted medications; Reverse supply chain; Game Theory
  • dc.description.abstract
  • Recently, environmental issues have raised an increasing amount of attention, which has led to a quick development of green supply chains. Particularly, the collection and disposal of unwanted medications (UMs) in households have been an increasingly important research topic. However, there is little work on building an effective reverse logistics (RL) system for collecting UMs. For stimulating more collections of UMs, an RL system with a points-exchange incentive scheme and advertising is proposed in this study. Based on Game Theory, this research takes the lead in investigating the effects of these two strategies in a two-echelon supply chain composed of a pharmaceutical manufacturer and a retailer. For the game theoretic analysis, four games are established: non-cooperative, retailer as the Stackelberg leader, manufacturer as the Stackelberg leader, and centralized games. There are three situations in each game, namely, the advertising-effective region, exchange-effective region, and joint-effective region. The optimal strategies of advertising and points-exchange proportion for both members are identified. In both joint-effective and exchange-effective regions, a preferable decentralized supply chain structure is the Nash policy, whereas it does not matter who leads the game in the advertising-effective region. Cooperation is crucial in the model, which results in a larger collection and more profit of the total supply chain. Finally, this study provides managerial implications and some suggestions for future research.
  • dc.description.sponsorshipPCode
  • FRG-17-044-MSB
  • dc.description.sponsorship
  • Macau University of Science and Technology Foundation [FRG-17-044-MSB]
  • dc.identifier.issn
  • 0925-5273
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