双重股权结构下的股份公司治理研究

The Research of Corporation Governance under the Dual-class Share Structure

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作者:

盛龄芳

导师:

韦忠语

导师单位:

民商法学院

学位:

硕士

语种:

其他

关键词:

双重股权结构;公司治理;中小投资者保护;完善建议

摘要:

双重股权结构突破传统的“一股一投票权”、“股权平等”原则,让同股在投票权方面具有差异。世界上许多国家逐步放开对双重股权结构的限制,公司被允许采用此种股权结构,这是适应证券市场创新需求的制度安排,顺应市场对公司治理创新的需求。本文在引言部分介绍了我国股份公司在国外交易所对双重股权结构的实践,以及国内外学者对双重股权结构研究的现状。正文的第一部分,通过具体阐述双重股权结构的含义,并在此基础上与投票权征集制度、阿里巴巴的“合伙人制度”进行比较,凸显双重股权结构制度在保持公司控制权方面所具有的独特优势。另外,通过与传统的单层股权结构进行比较,分析双重股权结构具有化解股权融资与控制权弱化的矛盾、防止敌意收购、减少因股权高度分散股东与经营者之间的代理成本、促进我国股权分散等方面的价值。公司治理是公司法讨论的核心问题,而股权结构又是公司治理中的一个核心问题。本文的第二部分,笔者通过对几种典型的公司治理模式进行细致的分析,得出公司以公平、自治为其治理理念。双重股权结构是对公司治理的一种创新,不限制公司采用双重股权结构,与公司自治的治理理念相契合。但双重股权结构赋予公司股东同股不同权,违背了公司法作为一种私法,应坚持的平等治理理念相冲突。正文的第三部分结合我国目前资本市场发展的现状,分析我国股份公司采用双重股权结构对公司治理的不利影响。一是双重股权结构赋予公司的创始股东与其出资不相匹配的投票权,可能产生创始股东滥用控制权、侵占公司的资产、损害中小投资者利益的不利影响;二是公司采用双重股权结构易影响公司利益相关者的利益,如职工激励机制不完善,职工难以有效地参与公司治理;公司治理的不完善,影响公司的债权融资;三是双重股权结构易造成公司的创始股东及其领导下的经营者怠于履行忠实、勤勉的义务,不利于公司的长远发展;四是双重股权结构易造成股东利益的“异质化”,削弱股东对公司经营者的监督,弱化公司的监督机制。目前我国法律不允许公司采用双重股权结构,理论界对我国是否采用双重股权结构尚未达成统一意见,主要分歧聚焦于中小投资者的保护。笔者建议通过以下措施,完善公司的内、外部治理机制以保护中小投资者,以期对我国公司未来采用双重股权结构配套机制的完善有一定的借鉴作用。内部治理机制包括股东投票表决权复活机制、网络投票权制度的推行,鼓励中小投资者参与公司治理、严格的信息披露制度,强化信息披露责任;外部治理机制包括引进股东现金选择权,增加中小投资者公平退出公司的渠道、成立专门处理投资纠纷的法庭,与证监会和证券交易所合作,克服专业性缺乏与信息不对称的障碍,对受到侵害的中小投资者提供完善的司法救济。正文的第五部分指出双重股权结构在我国发展的展望。未来随着我国公司治理内、外部治理机制的完善,应允许公司采用双重股权结构,顺应资本市场创新的需求。

学科:

民商法学

提交日期

2019-04-11

引用参考

盛龄芳. 双重股权结构下的股份公司治理研究[D]. 西南政法大学,2016.

全文附件授权许可

知识共享许可协议-署名

  • dc.title
  • 双重股权结构下的股份公司治理研究
  • dc.title
  • The Research of Corporation Governance under the Dual-class Share Structure
  • dc.contributor.schoolno
  • 20130301050407
  • dc.contributor.author
  • 盛龄芳
  • dc.contributor.affiliation
  • 民商法学院(知识产权学院)
  • dc.contributor.degree
  • 硕士
  • dc.contributor.childdegree
  • 法学硕士
  • dc.contributor.degreeConferringInstitution
  • 西南政法大学
  • dc.identifier.year
  • 2016
  • dc.contributor.advisor
  • 韦忠语
  • dc.contributor.advisorAffiliation
  • 民商法学院
  • dc.language.iso
  • 其他
  • dc.subject
  • 双重股权结构;公司治理;中小投资者保护;完善建议
  • dc.subject
  • Dual-class Share Structure;Corporate Governance;Protection of Small and Medium-sized Investors;Optimization of Suggestion
  • dc.description.abstract
  • 双重股权结构突破传统的“一股一投票权”、“股权平等”原则,让同股在投票权方面具有差异。世界上许多国家逐步放开对双重股权结构的限制,公司被允许采用此种股权结构,这是适应证券市场创新需求的制度安排,顺应市场对公司治理创新的需求。本文在引言部分介绍了我国股份公司在国外交易所对双重股权结构的实践,以及国内外学者对双重股权结构研究的现状。正文的第一部分,通过具体阐述双重股权结构的含义,并在此基础上与投票权征集制度、阿里巴巴的“合伙人制度”进行比较,凸显双重股权结构制度在保持公司控制权方面所具有的独特优势。另外,通过与传统的单层股权结构进行比较,分析双重股权结构具有化解股权融资与控制权弱化的矛盾、防止敌意收购、减少因股权高度分散股东与经营者之间的代理成本、促进我国股权分散等方面的价值。公司治理是公司法讨论的核心问题,而股权结构又是公司治理中的一个核心问题。本文的第二部分,笔者通过对几种典型的公司治理模式进行细致的分析,得出公司以公平、自治为其治理理念。双重股权结构是对公司治理的一种创新,不限制公司采用双重股权结构,与公司自治的治理理念相契合。但双重股权结构赋予公司股东同股不同权,违背了公司法作为一种私法,应坚持的平等治理理念相冲突。正文的第三部分结合我国目前资本市场发展的现状,分析我国股份公司采用双重股权结构对公司治理的不利影响。一是双重股权结构赋予公司的创始股东与其出资不相匹配的投票权,可能产生创始股东滥用控制权、侵占公司的资产、损害中小投资者利益的不利影响;二是公司采用双重股权结构易影响公司利益相关者的利益,如职工激励机制不完善,职工难以有效地参与公司治理;公司治理的不完善,影响公司的债权融资;三是双重股权结构易造成公司的创始股东及其领导下的经营者怠于履行忠实、勤勉的义务,不利于公司的长远发展;四是双重股权结构易造成股东利益的“异质化”,削弱股东对公司经营者的监督,弱化公司的监督机制。目前我国法律不允许公司采用双重股权结构,理论界对我国是否采用双重股权结构尚未达成统一意见,主要分歧聚焦于中小投资者的保护。笔者建议通过以下措施,完善公司的内、外部治理机制以保护中小投资者,以期对我国公司未来采用双重股权结构配套机制的完善有一定的借鉴作用。内部治理机制包括股东投票表决权复活机制、网络投票权制度的推行,鼓励中小投资者参与公司治理、严格的信息披露制度,强化信息披露责任;外部治理机制包括引进股东现金选择权,增加中小投资者公平退出公司的渠道、成立专门处理投资纠纷的法庭,与证监会和证券交易所合作,克服专业性缺乏与信息不对称的障碍,对受到侵害的中小投资者提供完善的司法救济。正文的第五部分指出双重股权结构在我国发展的展望。未来随着我国公司治理内、外部治理机制的完善,应允许公司采用双重股权结构,顺应资本市场创新的需求。
  • dc.description.abstract
  • Dual-class share structure breaks the principle of “one share one voting right”, the equity principle of equality, which makes same shares have different voting rights. Many countries in the world gradually let go of the limitation on the dual-class share structure, allowing companies adopt this kind of share structure. This is the system arrangement to meet the needs of the securities market innovation, adapt to the market demand for corporate governance innovation. This article in the introduction part introduces the joint-stock company of our country in the practice of foreign exchange on dual-class share structure and the research status of domestic and foreign scholars on dual share structure.The first part of the body elaborates on the meanings of dual-class share structure, and on this basis, comparing Proxy Solicitation and Alibaba group’ "partner" with dual-class share structure is that highlights the Dual-class share structure with unique advantages in keeping corporate control. In addition, through comparing with the traditional single share structure, dual-class share structure has following value: resolving the contradiction between equity financing and corporate right of control coexist, preventing a hostile takeover, reducing agency cost between shareholders and managers because of the high dispersion equity, and promoting equity separation in our country, etc. Corporate governance is the core issue of company law; also, the equity structure is a core issue of corporate governance. In the second part of this article, the author intend to analyze several kinds of typical corporate governance modes detailed in order to conclude that fair, autonomy is company’s governance concept. Dual share structure is a kind of corporate governance innovation; without limiting the company adopting dual share structure corresponds to the autonomy concept of the traditional corporate governance. But dual-class share structure gives shareholders with different voting rights, violates the equality concept of company law, which, as a kind of private law, should adhere to. Combining with the current status of development of the capital market in our country, the third part of the body analyzes adverse effect on corporate governance, when the incorporated company adopts dual share structure. The first adverse effect is that dual-class share structure give the company's founding shareholders voting rights, which is not matching their contributions, the probable consequence is that the founding shareholders probably abuse control of company, seize the assets of the company, damage the interests of small and medium investors; The second adverse effect is that adopting dual-class share structure probably influence the interests of stakeholders, if staff incentive mechanism is imperfect, the worker has difficult effectively participating in corporate governance, the corporate governance will not work, at last ,it will influence company's creditor's rights financing; The third adverse effect is that the founding shareholders of the company and its operator of their leadership are easy to delay in performing the responsibility of loyalty and diligence, which is not conducive to the company's long-term development; the four adverse effect is that dual –class share structure is easy to cause the interests of the shareholders "heterogeneity", weaken the supervision of the shareholders to the company’s operators, weaken the supervision mechanism of corporate governance. At present, the law of our country does not allow the company adopts dual share structure, the theoretical circle of our country has not yet reached a consensus about adopting the dual share structure, and the main differences concentrate on the protection of the small and medium-sized investors. The author suggested by the following measures to improve the company's internal and external governance mechanism in order to protect the small and medium-sized investors, to perfect related mechanism for the future when the company of our country adopts dual share structure. internal governance mechanisms includes vote resurrection mechanism of shareholders, encouraging small and medium-sized investors to participate in corporate governance by the implementation of the online voting system, strengthening information disclosure responsibility by strict information disclosure system; External governance mechanism includes increasing the channels of small and medium-sized investors to fair quit the company by introduction of shareholders cash option, setting up specialized court to deal with investment disputes and strengthening cooperation with securities regulatory commission and the stock exchange to overcome the obstacles of professional ’s lack and of information asymmetry, for small and medium-sized investors can get better judicial relief.The fifth part of the body points out the prospect of the development of the dual share structure in our country, in the future, with the improvement of the internal and external corporate governance mechanism in our country, company should be allowed to adopt dual share structure, to conform to the requirements of innovation in the capital market.
  • dc.subject.discipline
  • D
  • dc.date.issued
  • 2026-04-10
  • dc.date.oralDefense
  • 2016-05-20
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