控股股东股权质押能帮助公司扭亏吗?——来自中国亏损上市公司的证据

Will Controlling Shareholders' Share Pledging Help Loss Firms?Evidence from Chinese Loss Listed Firms

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归属院系:

经济学院

作者:

杜勇 ;张欢 ;杜军 ;韩佳丽

摘要:

近年来,控股股东为获得资金频繁地质押其股权,尽管股权质押有诸多好处,但也可能导致控股股东失去对上市公司的控制权。文章以2009—2014年发生亏损的中国A股上市公司为研究对象,结合亏损公司的财务特征,分析和检验了控股股东股权质押对公司扭亏的影响。实证结果表明:控股股东股权质押对亏损公司扭亏具有显著的正向影响,上述关系在非连续亏损公司、高管持股公司更加明显。此外,文章发现控股股东股权质押提高了亏损公司的异常非经常性损益以及报告微利的概率,并且增加了亏损公司扭亏后再次发生亏损的概率。这意味着对于存在控股股东股权质押的亏损公司,为避免控制权转移风险,控股股东很可能通过粉饰报表的方式帮助公司在短期内实现扭亏为盈,但对公司扭亏持续性未起到明显的积极作用。这一研究结果对政府部门改进金融监管、防范系统性金融风险具有一定的参考价值。

语种:

中文

出版日期:

2018-12-01

学科:

金融学

收录:

CSSCI; 中国科技核心期刊

提交日期

2018-12-20

引用参考

杜勇;张欢;杜军;韩佳丽. 控股股东股权质押能帮助公司扭亏吗?——来自中国亏损上市公司的证据[J]. 上海财经大学学报,2018(06):77-93.

全文附件授权许可

知识共享许可协议-署名

  • dc.title
  • 控股股东股权质押能帮助公司扭亏吗?——来自中国亏损上市公司的证据
  • dc.contributor.author
  • 杜勇;张欢;杜军;韩佳丽
  • dc.contributor.author
  • Du Yong;Zhang Huan;Du Jun;Han Jiali;College of Economics and Management, Southwest University;School of Management, Guangdong Ocean University;School of Economics, Southwest University of Political Science &Law
  • dc.contributor.affiliation
  • 西南大学经济管理学院;广东海洋大学管理学院;西南政法大学经济学院;
  • dc.publisher
  • 上海财经大学学报
  • dc.publisher
  • Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
  • dc.identifier.year
  • 2018
  • dc.identifier.issue
  • 06
  • dc.identifier.volume
  • v.20;No.116
  • dc.identifier.page
  • 77-93
  • dc.date.issued
  • 2018-12-01
  • dc.language.iso
  • 中文
  • dc.subject
  • 亏损公司;控股股东;股权质押;扭亏
  • dc.subject
  • loss firms;controlling shareholders;share pledging;loss reversal
  • dc.description.abstract
  • 近年来,控股股东为获得资金频繁地质押其股权,尽管股权质押有诸多好处,但也可能导致控股股东失去对上市公司的控制权。文章以2009—2014年发生亏损的中国A股上市公司为研究对象,结合亏损公司的财务特征,分析和检验了控股股东股权质押对公司扭亏的影响。实证结果表明:控股股东股权质押对亏损公司扭亏具有显著的正向影响,上述关系在非连续亏损公司、高管持股公司更加明显。此外,文章发现控股股东股权质押提高了亏损公司的异常非经常性损益以及报告微利的概率,并且增加了亏损公司扭亏后再次发生亏损的概率。这意味着对于存在控股股东股权质押的亏损公司,为避免控制权转移风险,控股股东很可能通过粉饰报表的方式帮助公司在短期内实现扭亏为盈,但对公司扭亏持续性未起到明显的积极作用。这一研究结果对政府部门改进金融监管、防范系统性金融风险具有一定的参考价值。
  • dc.description.abstract
  • In recent years, controlling shareholders frequently pledge their shares seeking for loans, and this phenomenon has attracted much attention in Chinese capital market. Although share pledging has many advantages, it may lead to losing the controlling right of firms for controlling shareholders. There are two reasons why controlling shareholders' share pledging of loss firms is worthy of research. First, many Chinese industrial enterprises face serious problems such as overcapacity and high costs of labor, resulting in lower performance. Therefore, there are increasing loss firms in Chinese capital market. Second, due to poor performance, it is difficult to finance directly from banks for the loss firms. Thus, share pledging becomes an alternative financing method. Based on the data, we find that loss firms' controlling shareholders are more likely than high performing firms' controlling shareholders to pledge their shares. However, share pledging of loss firms' controlling shareholders remains largely unexplored. Using a dataset of Chinese loss listed firms from 2009 to 2014, we investigate the effect of controlling shareholders' share pledging on the likelihood of loss reversal. We document that loss firms estimate to be more likely to reverse if controlling shareholders pledge their shares, that is to say, share pledging increases the probability of firms' return to profitability, and the above relation is more obvious among inconsecutive loss firms and firms with executive shareholdings. However,we find that controlling shareholders' share pledging is positively related to the percentage of abnormal non-recurring gains and losses, and also increases the probability of reporting small profits. The results further show that controlling shareholders' share pledging increases the probability of another loss after loss reversal, and this means that controlling shareholders of loss firms may whitewash accounting statement to avoid the risk of controlling right transfer. This study has several contributions as follows. First, we complement prior literature that investigates the consequences of controlling shareholders' share pledging. There is growing evidence showing that controlling shareholders' share pledging could affect firm behavior, such as earnings management, information disclosure, tax avoidance, and performance. We extend this literature by studying the effect of share pledging on loss reversal. Second, this study contributes to the research on loss firms. A stream of literature investigates how to reverse the loss for firms, we focus on the role of controlling shareholders, and find that share pledging of controlling shareholders influences the probability of reversing loss. Our findings complement this body of research. Third, this study also provides some implications for the government and investors. We find that controlling shareholders with share pledging can help loss firms struggle to be profitable for avoiding the transfer of controlling right, but this effect is unsustainable which indicates that controlling shareholders with share pledging may whitewash accounting statement to realize profits, rather than improve loss firms' operation situation. Thus, regulators and investors should pay more attention to financial reporting quality of loss firms that shares are pledged by controlling shareholders.
  • dc.description.sponsorship
  • 国家自然科学基金面上项目“社会资本视域下的中国上市公司亏损逆转质量:结构特征、驱动机理与经济后果”(71572153); 重庆市社会科学规划项目“跨境电子商务企业经营风险预警与防范机制研究”(2017YBGL159); 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目重大培育项目“新常态下管理者亏损风险感知对公司金融化行为偏差的影响机理及经济后果研究”(SWU1709201); 西南大学人文社会科学重大培育项目“社会资本视域的中国上市公司亏损逆转质量研究”(15XDSKZD005)
  • dc.description.sponsorshipsource
  • 国家自然科学基金
  • dc.identifier.CN
  • 31-1817/C
  • dc.identifier.issn
  • 1009-0150
  • dc.identifier.if
  • 1.520
  • dc.subject.discipline
  • F832.51
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