机构投资者持股、大股东控制与持续经营审计意见

Institutional Investors Holdings,Control of the Largest Shareholder and Going-concern Opinions

传播影响力
本库下载频次:
本库浏览频次:
CNKI下载频次:0

归属学者:

李传宪

作者:

李传宪 ;黄雅宁

摘要:

基于我国沪深A股上市公司2008-2014年的数据,本文运用Logistic回归方法分析我国机构投资者持股与上市公司被出具持续经营审计意见之间的关系,并依据我国上市公司大股东控制和国有控股的现状,分组检验大股东控制与国有控股对这两者之间关系的影响。研究结果表明:机构投资者持股比例越高,上市公司被出具持续经营审计意见的概率越小。这种现象只在大股东非绝对控制和非国有控股的上市公司中存在,这表明大股东控制和国有控股抑制了机构投资者对公司持续经营能力的治理作用。

语种:

中文

出版日期:

2016-12-10

学科:

产业经济学; 会计学

收录:

北大核心期刊; 中国科技核心期刊; CSSCI

提交日期

2018-01-11

引用参考

李传宪;黄雅宁. 机构投资者持股、大股东控制与持续经营审计意见[J]. 商业研究,2016(12):110-117+131.

全文附件授权许可

知识共享许可协议-署名

  • dc.title
  • 机构投资者持股、大股东控制与持续经营审计意见
  • dc.contributor.author
  • 李传宪;黄雅宁
  • dc.contributor.author
  • LI Chuan-xian;HUANG Ya-ning;School of Management, Southwest University of Political Science and Law
  • dc.contributor.affiliation
  • 西南政法大学管理学院;
  • dc.publisher
  • 商业研究
  • dc.publisher
  • Commercial Research
  • dc.identifier.year
  • 2016
  • dc.identifier.issue
  • 12
  • dc.identifier.volume
  • No.476
  • dc.identifier.page
  • 110-117+131
  • dc.date.issued
  • 2016-12-10
  • dc.language.iso
  • 中文
  • dc.subject
  • 机构投资者持股;;持续经营;;大股东控制;;国有控股
  • dc.subject
  • institutional investors holdings;;sustainable management;;control of the largest shareholder;;state-owned controlling
  • dc.description.abstract
  • 基于我国沪深A股上市公司2008-2014年的数据,本文运用Logistic回归方法分析我国机构投资者持股与上市公司被出具持续经营审计意见之间的关系,并依据我国上市公司大股东控制和国有控股的现状,分组检验大股东控制与国有控股对这两者之间关系的影响。研究结果表明:机构投资者持股比例越高,上市公司被出具持续经营审计意见的概率越小。这种现象只在大股东非绝对控制和非国有控股的上市公司中存在,这表明大股东控制和国有控股抑制了机构投资者对公司持续经营能力的治理作用。
  • dc.description.abstract
  • Based on the data of Chinese A-share listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market from 2008 to 2014,this paper analyzes the relationship between institutional investors holdings and the probability of the listed company being issued a going-concern opinion by Logistic Regression method,and tests the effect of the largest shareholder's control and the state-owned controlling on the relationship between institutional investors holdings and going-concern opinions by group testing considering the reality of the largest shareholder's control and the state-owned controlling of Chinese listed companies. The results show that the higher proportion of stock held by the institutional investors,the lower probability of the listed company being issued a going-concern opinion,and this phenomenon only exists in the non-absolute control of the largest shareholder and the non-state owned controlling sample,which shows that the control of the largest shareholder and the state-owned controlling restrain the governance role of institutional investors on the ability of sustainable management.
  • dc.identifier.CN
  • 23-1364/F
  • dc.identifier.issn
  • 1001-148X
  • dc.identifier.if
  • 0.562
  • dc.subject.discipline
  • F271;F239.4
回到顶部